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Abstract 
 
Analysts predicted a shift in Syria‘s foreign and domestic politics after the death 
of Hafiz el-Assad in 2000. Expectations were high that Bashar will initiate political, 
social and economic reforms. These expectations began to fade when Bashar‘s policies 
started looking more of an extension of his father‘s policies. Though Bashar introduced 
significant domestic economic reforms, his foreign policy choices remained anchored 
on his father‘s geopolitical principles. Nevertheless, Bashar‘s geopolitical world 
changed after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This 
thesis examines how Bashar responded to the geopolitical threats unleashed by the 
invasion and occupation of Iraq. It traces the continuity and change in Syria‘s foreign 
policy under Bashar in a number of pertinent geopolitical theatres, namely Lebanon, 
Iran, Turkey and Iraq. The thesis closes by evaluating the impact the 2011 popular 
protests in Syria on Bashar‘s foreign policy choices. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“The foreign policy of states is shaped by their national situations, by the values 
and perceptions of policy-makers, and by the global and regional environments 
in which they exist” (Paul Noble 1991). 
 
 
1.1 - Situating the Thesis 
After the death of Hafiz el-Assad in 2000, international and domestic analysts 
saw in Bashar el-Assad the possibility of a shift in Syrian politics. This stemmed out of 
Bashar‘s foreign education. The bets were high on seeing in Bashar the initiator of 
political, social and economic reform in Syria. Nevertheless, this bubble of change 
started to slowly fade away when Bashar‘s policies were based on an extension of his 
father‘s policies. Though Bashar has introduced some changes in the domestic affairs of 
Syria, yet his foreign policies followed the footsteps of his father‘s. It is very important 
to note here that the difference between the political eras between Hafiz and Bashar 
resulted in a shift of Bashar‘s foreign policies with some countries such as the 
Lebanese-Syrian relations and the Iraqi-Syrian relations.  
Hafiz el-Assad‘s foreign policy is what earned him the respect of the Syrian 
people and of the Arab World making it hard for Bashar to side track from it. Many of 
Hafiz‘s foreign policy decisions lay behind his popularity especially when it came to his 
Arab nationalist rhetoric. The Arab-Israeli conflict and his position on it accentuated his 
popularity and were used wistfully to fulfil his foreign policy aspirations.  Hafiz used 
his obstinate position on not signing a peace agreement with Israel until the acquirement 
of all occupied territories especially the Golan Heights to gain popular sentiment.  This 
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fact made him different from Egypt‘s Anwar el Sadat, Jordan‘s King Husayn and PLO‘s 
Yasir Arafat in the eyes of the Arab people. 
During his rule, Hafiz el-Assad dedicated more attention to foreign policy than 
he did to internal affairs. Even Syrians who criticize his authoritarian rule admit that he 
was a ―master player in the regional and international arenas, skilfully extracting the 
maximum returns from often unpromising circumstances‖ (George 2003, 17). Hafiz had 
always pursued control over Syria‘s direct neighbours, formerly ―Greater Syria‖.  
After the death of Hafiz el-Assad in 2000, international and domestic analysts 
saw in Bashar el-Assad the possibility of a shift in Syrian politics. This stemmed out of 
Bashar‘s foreign education. The bets were high on seeing in Bashar the initiator of 
political, social and economic reform in Syria. Nevertheless, this bubble of change 
started to slowly fade away when Bashar‘s policies were based on an extension of his 
father‘s policies. Though Bashar has introduced some changes in the domestic affairs of 
Syria, yet his foreign policies followed the footsteps of his father‘s. It is very important 
to note here that the difference between the political eras between Hafiz and Bashar 
resulted in a shift of Bashar‘s foreign policies with some countries such as the 
Lebanese-Syrian relations and the Iraqi-Syrian relations.  
Hafiz el-Assad‘s foreign policy is what earned him the respect of the Syrian 
people and of the Arab World making it hard for Bashar to side track from it. Many of 
Hafiz‘s foreign policy decisions lay behind his popularity especially when it came to his 
Arab nationalist rhetoric. The Arab-Israeli conflict and his position on it accentuated his 
popularity and were used wistfully to fulfil his foreign policy aspirations.  Hafiz used 
his obstinate position on not signing a peace agreement with Israel until the acquirement 
of all occupied territories especially the Golan Heights to gain popular sentiment.  This 
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fact made him different from Egypt‘s Anwar el Sadat, Jordan‘s King Husayn and PLO‘s 
Yasir Arafat in the eyes of the Arab people. 
On the other hand, Bashar‘s accession to power was a smooth one since the 
stakes were highly set on him. This was evident in his inauguration speech when he 
declared that he would not only lead the country based on his father‘s policies, he would 
also develop these policies further to better serve Syria. In his first years in power 
Bashar realized that his plans for reform were far-fetched within the status quo though 
his presidency stemmed out of the same regime. The Baath regime presented a dilemma 
for Bashar as he could not attain the reforms Syria needed under its rule or could his 
presidency survive without this specific regime.  
 As a reaction to this bleak picture, Bashar appointed new political figures which 
might help him in his strategy. He consolidated a personal staff of young men of his age 
to assist him in leading Syria towards change, people like Imad Zuhayr Mustafa, Sami 
al-Kuhaymi, Abdallah al Dardari, Mohammad Mahir Mujtahid, Durayd Dargham, and 
Mohammad Sabuni. These are technocrats who were able to introduce administrative as 
well as economic reforms to the country. However, this group does not have a power 
base in the country.  
In the meantime, Bashar needed the presence of the powerful men who had 
supported Hafiz el Assad‘s regime, like the Assad and the Makhluf clans and the 
Kalbiyya tribe, as well as high ranking Alawi officers, to manage the affairs of the state 
and to preserve the security of the regime. Bashar‘s first years in the presidency have 
shown that he is introducing economic reform in Syria while maintaining the 
geopolitical orientation of the foreign policy inherited from his father.   
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Looking at Bashar‘s foreign policy and comparing it to Hafiz‘s one cannot but 
realize that the former hasnot always been a continuation of the latter‘s policies. 
Bashar‘s foreign policy choices are best explained as reactions to his geopolitical 
context of the region. This is an important angle to look at since Bashar is not deviating 
from his father‘s foreign policy, but rather responding to new geopolitical challenges. 
 
1.2 - Research Question 
What explains Syrian foreign policy under Bashar al-Assad? And how is it 
different from that of Hafiz al-Assad? These are the research questions that drive this 
thesis. Bashar has maintained the geopolitical orientation of his father‘s foreign policy 
but has taken it to new dimensions given new geopolitical challenges and opportunities. 
This will be demonstrated through a number of case studies of Syrian foreign policy 
towards Iran, Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and Lebanon. 
 The most important objectives of Hafiz el Assad‘s Syrian foreign policy were 
the peace talks with Israel, recovering the Golan Heights, Syria‘s regional and 
international power and its relations with the neighbouring Arab countries (Ghadbian 
2001, 627). Syria‘s foreign policy has been determined by its Arab nationalist identity. 
Bashar el Assad‘s greatest concern is the recovery of the Golan Heights from Israel. It is 
also concerned with balancing its power against Israel, to the West, and the United 
States in Iraq, to the East (Hinnebusch 2010, 5). Bashar‘s reaction to the pressure put on 
him by the U.S. has been to build alliances with countries in the region and globally 
starting with Turkey (Hinnebusch 2010, 11).  
 
1.3 - Methodology 
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This thesis uses the case-study method to look at the transformation of Syrian 
foreign policy under Bashar‘s presidency. It examines Bashar‘s policies towards Iraq, 
Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon. The thesis also discusses the United States‘ policy towards 
Syria and the latter‘s reaction to it. This thesis explains Bashar‘s behaviour vis-a-vis the 
balance of power theory which is based on a geopolitical explanation of foreign policy 
choices. The qualitative approach used in this thesis employs both primary and 
secondary sources. The former consist of newspapers and Bashar‘s speeches, while the 
latter includes books, articles and internet sources. These sources are used to examine 
the geopolitical transformations in Bashar‘s foreign policy in comparison to Hafiz‘s. 
 
1.4 - Map of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis, 
examines the research question and the methodology to be used in the paper in trying to 
answer the research question.  
The second chapter presents the theoretical arguments explaining Bashar‘s 
foreign policy choices in relation to Hafiz‘s, it also provide a brief introduction about 
the background of the Baath party and about Hafiz al-Assad. This chapter undertakes 
this exercise through a realist explanation of the Syrian foreign policy mainly focusing 
on Bashar el-Assad‘s international and regional foreign policies. The geopolitical 
approach towards foreign policy making is discussed by explaining the different 
characteristics of this approach from the realist point of view.  
The third chapter explains Hafiz‘s realist foreign policy legacy and those foreign 
policy decisions taken by Hafiz and continued under Bashar. This chapter discusses 
how Bashar el-Assad has maintained his father‘s strategy in his relation with three 
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countries Iran, Turkey and Israel. His strategy was born out of his need to sustain 
Syria‘s strategically powerful position in the Middle East and as a part of the strategy to 
balance the power of Israel in the region. The chapter starts by studying the Syrian-
Iranian relations and how they evolved between Hafiz and Bashar. This will be 
discussed while emphasizing on the friendly relations that persisted even with the 
United States as well as international opposition to these relations. Then this chapter 
moves to studying the Syrian-Turkish relations that have always been characterized of 
being relatively quiet but not absent of tensions. It will explain the reasons behind this 
tension by focusing on issues related to border, problems pertaining to water and river 
right, political orientation, to religious stance, smuggling, drug-trafficking, and 
terrorism. It will also discuss how the two governments renounced obvious aggression, 
and how their relations developed in the 1980s in comparison to the 1950s and 1960s. 
Finally this chapter tackles the Syrian-Israeli relations, how it is directly linked to the 
Arab- Israeli conflict and how it is the enduring struggle in Syria‘s foreign policy. It 
will discuss Syria‘s main aim to retrieve the occupied territories through the peace talks 
it held with Israel as well as the attacks it constantly initiated at the Lebanese Southern 
borders.  
   The fourth chapter looks at Bashar‘s geopolitical battles which led him to 
make transformations in Syrian foreign policy. It examines Syria‘s reactions to a 
number of geopolitical shifts in Iraq and Lebanon. This chapter examines how Bashar 
el-Assad survived the pressures exerted on him by the American administration which 
led to the Syria Accountability Act in hope that Syria would cave in and relinquish its 
‗anti-Western‘ foreign policy. These pressures culminated after the war on Iraq when 
the U.S. stated that Syria deliberately opened its borders and allowed Islamic terrorist to 
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cross into Iraq. Then this chapter examines how Bashar el-Assad reacted to these 
pressures, and how he had to change his father‘s policy towards Iraq and Lebanon 
because of the new challenges Syria faced. It starts by the Lebanon case from its 
occupation by Hafiz el-Assad to the redeployment of the Syrian troops under Bashar el-
Assad with a focus on the Syrian support for Hizbullah in order to pressure the Israel. It 
also examines the Syrian-Iraqi relations which shifted form ultimate animosity under 
Hafiz to neighbourly relations under Bashar after opposing the 2003 military attack on 
Saddam Hussein. It focuses on the reasons behind this shift with a discussion of Syrian-
American diplomatic struggle.   
The fifth chapter concludes the thesis and its aspects, a discussion of the current 
situation in Syria will follow. It will discuss the current uprising in Syria, with questions 
on how the long-lasting focus on foreign relations, with Hafiz and Bashar, rather than 
internal problems is no longer benefiting the regime in Syria. Also it will examine the 
relations between Syria and its neighbouring countries, such as Turkey, have been 
affected by this uprising.  
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CHAPTER TWO  
THE REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
This chapter examines the characteristics of the realist theory of international 
affairs, its evolving forms and the challenges facing its supporters in the past decade. In 
a brief explanation of the realist‘s theory, two rival theories are also examined; the two 
theories are liberalism and constructivism. Some of the founding scholars and latest 
prominent practitioners of these theories mainly used in this analysis are Morgenthau, 
Walt, Hinnebusch and many others. Of course the debate over which theory is the best 
to apply on foreign policy-making and in analysing state behaviour is an on-going 
dispute since the birth of these theories. 
 This chapter undertakes this exercise through a realist explanation of the Syrian 
foreign policy mainly focusing on Bashar el-Assad‘s international and regional foreign 
policies. The geopolitical approach towards foreign policy making is discussed by 
explaining the different characteristics of this approach from the realist point of view.  
This chapter also traces back the historical background of Hafiz el-Assad‘s rule 
in Syria highlighting his regional and international relations since his accession to 
power in 1970. After his death in 2000 and Bashar el-Assad‘s succession to power 
started, some policies were maintained while others changed. The historical background 
sheds light on the similarities and differences between father and son‘s foreign policies 
in both the region and internationally.  
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2.2 - Review of Foreign Policy Theories 
The on-going debate in the explanation of political actions is usually based on 
the ideologies of the parties or politicians involved. Explanation of politics cannot be 
achieved without going back to its core. Even politicians who disapprove of ideological 
theories base their decision-making on their own theoretical background and conception 
of the world order. Thus the scholarly work of international relations is of great 
importance to practitioners as it is to students and academics. Theories help us make 
sense of the bulk of news that we receive all the time. 
The three competing paradigms explaining foreign affairs relevant to the study 
at hand are realism, liberalism and constructivism. These three theories all have their 
share in explaining modern world policy making. Nonetheless ―no single approach can 
capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics‖ and we should be using a set 
of competing ideas instead of basing our explanations on one single theory (Walt 1998, 
30).  
One of the founding scholars of the realist theory, Hans Morgenthau, explains 
that statesmen think mainly of interest defined as power. This idea of interest is the core 
of politics and is not marked by the concept of time and place. In the ongoing struggle 
of the protection of national security, statesmen have tried to acquire as many power 
resources as possible. As such, in an anarchical international system, relations between 
states are defined by their level of power which is derived from their military and 
economical capabilities (Morgenthau, 1998). 
Stephen Walt explains the three evolving forms of realism which are the 
classical, neo-realists and defensive realism. In his analysis of these different forms, 
Walt traces back the classical approach to Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr who 
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―believed that states, like human beings, had an innate need to dominate others, which 
led them to fight wars‖ (Walt 1998, 31). The idea of dominance of others has been 
obtained out of the intrinsic needs of human beings and applied to states.  
 As for neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz, they focused their justification of state 
behaviour on the need for survival on their own. However, the anarchic world order is a 
set back to the attainment of such a notion. Waltz goes on to consider that weak states 
tend to balance against more powerful states rather than bandwagon with them (Walt 
1998, 31). 
The third approach Waltz took into consideration was the newly found offense-
defence theory. These scholars such as Robert Jervis, George Quester, and Stephen Van 
Evera deducted systematically that since war is more likely in the case of offence of 
different states against each other, defence would be an easier alternative for these 
states‘ cooperation process. Instead of trying to conquer each other and lose, they are 
more prone to cooperate once they realize it is more fruitful. (Walt, 1998, 31) 
 Thus, states tend to be defensive and great power wars happen because states 
create an ―exaggerated perceptions of threat and an excessive faith in the efficacy of 
military force‖ (Walt 1998, 37). On the other hand, Randall Schweller pointed that 
statesmen like Adolf Hitler and Napoleon Bonaparte are offensive and they yearn for is 
more  important to them than what they have. Also, Peter Liberman explains that the 
Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet control of Western Europe both 
benefited from their conquests more than it cost them. Finally, theorists of offensive 
realism like Eric Labs, John Mearsheimer, and Fareed Zakaria claim that states tend to 
increase their strength relatively in a state of anarchy because they never know when a 
political power might rise (Brooks 1997, 50). 
11 
 
However, the liberal founding fathers Emmanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson 
argue that realism does not account for progress between states. Liberals predict the 
path away from the anarchic world of the realists through economic relations between 
states. They explain that democracies will not wage wars on each other because they 
find the other legitimate (Snyder 2004, 56). Several scholars claim that globalization; 
the creation of non-governmental institutions and the increasing spread of worldwide 
communication is decreasing states‘ power and moving their attention away from 
military concern more towards economics (Walt 1998, 40). However the persistence of 
conflict between states even in the era of economic interdependence and globalization 
―does not surprise realists‖ (Snyder 2004, 57). 
Jack Snyder supports Walt‘s argument by noticing that each theory not only 
gives an explanation of its own but is a check on the others. The three theories point out 
the weakness in the arguments of modern politicians which leads to misguided 
policies(Snyder 2004, 55). Focusing on Walt‘s explanation of the three theories, Jack 
Snyder emphasizes that international affairs theories are still needed to explain foreign 
policy decision-making of politicians such as Georges W Bush and Condoleezza Rice.  
The study of international relations is supposed to tell us how the world works. 
It‘s a tall order, and even the best theories fall short. But they can puncture 
illusions and strip away the simplistic brand names- such as ―neocons‖ or 
―liberal hawks‖- that dominate foreign-policy debates. Even in a radically 
changing world, the classic theories have a lot to say (Snyder 2004, 53).  
 
Realism explains international affairs as a conflict between self-interested states. 
Realists are pessimistic about human nature and states‘ urge to go to war. However, 
Snyder is more optimistic and argues that it is not necessarily the case; a vicious 
rationality about power struggle can lead into a more peaceful world. In the last decade 
the realist approach had an appeal in U.S. politics. 
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Realists best explain post 9/11 U.S. behaviour. They argue that the United States 
as a state has grown far more powerful militarily than any of its rivals, leading to use its 
power to try to dominate other states for security reasons. This fact, Snyder explains, 
undermines the concept of balance of power which is realism‘s main thesis. No alliance 
of states can face the American‘s military power. Even the policies of France and 
Germany can challenge the United States diplomatically which can be seen as classical 
balancing of power; however, they do not oppose its military dominance.  
The United States due to its geographical distance from other parts of the world 
does not usually impose an immediate threat to other countries. An example is the threat 
of Israel rather than the United States in the Middle East is the main drive for small 
countries to ally themselves together in an attempt to balance Israel‘s power in the 
region. (Snyder 2004, 56) 
On the other hand, the main opposing theories to realism derive from liberal 
thought. Liberal theories discourage states from waging wars against each other due to 
economic interdependence.  Another theory claimed that democratic states are less 
prone to waging wars than authoritarian states thus the path to world peace is the spread 
of democracy. The latest theory claims that international institutions help states 
overcome their search for immediate gains and look for long term relationship (Walt 
1998, 32) 
The latter theory is contradicted by a newer form of the realist theory related to 
the problem of ―relative and absolute gains‖. Realists like Joseph Grieco and Stephen 
Krasner claim that anarchy entails states to worry about both angles of cooperation; 
absolute gains and how these gains are distributed among the parties. If one party 
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acquires more gains than the other, it will become strong and the other will become 
weaker (Walt 1998, 35). 
Constructivism is realisms rival theory on the updated form of idealism. While 
realism and liberalism focus on substantial aspects, i.e. state power and economic 
relations, constructivism focuses on ideas, interests, and identities of states that are 
constructed throughout their history (Walt 1998, 40). Constructivist scholars focus on 
societies‘ trend of behaviour because it shapes their norms and interests. Furthermore, 
with the evolving norms of societies, some scholars are shifting their attention from the 
classic boundaries of states towards issues of identity. The way states would react in the 
international arena is based on the ideas they created of themselves. For example, the 
United States identifies itself as ―a global policeman‖ and how European countries 
define themselves as part of a continent (Walt 1998, 41). It is important to note that 
ideas and identities change with time and this may create indirect alterations in states 
behaviour, which, in turn, leads to unpredicted changes in international affairs.   
Constructivism is a valued theory in understanding post 9/11 era since it stresses 
on ―the role of ideologies, identities, persuasion, and transnational networks‖ (Snyder 
2004, 60). Constructivists argue that dispute about concepts is in the core of 
international relations. Authors such as Michael Barnett and Daniel Philpott best 
explain Arabs radicalism in post 9/11 internal relations of states (Snyder 2004, 61). 
All these rival theories are required to construct a comprehensive understanding 
of sates‘ behaviour, and they all have a part in explaining world politics. Nevertheless, 
this thesis suggests that realist explanation of international affairs best explains Syrian 
foreign policy. It will focus on the geopolitical status-quo and changes in the Arab 
region to explain Bashar el-Assad‘s continuation of his father‘s policy in regard to 
14 
 
certain neighbouring countries, as opposed to his change of his father‘s foreign policy 
towards other neighbouring countries. 
 
2.3 - Explaining Syrian Foreign Policy 
Najib Ghadbian compares two spheres in Syrian politics, domestic affairs and 
foreign relations. He argues that Hafiz el-Assad‘s foreign policy is what earned him the 
respect of the Syrian people and of the Arab World; consequently, Bashar will not side-
track from his father‘s foreign policy. Because Hafiz‘s foreign policy was viewed 
positively by the Syrians in specific and the Arabs in general. His perseverance on not 
signing a peace agreement with Israel until acquiring all the Syrian territory occupied by 
Israel is of a great stir to his popularity at the time. This fact made him different from 
Egypt‘s Anwar el Sadat, Jordan‘s King Husayn and PLO‘s Yasir Arafat in the eyes of 
the Arab people. Thus for Ghadbian, if Bashar el-Assad achieves peace with Israel on 
Syrian conditions, it will earn him the assertion he needs. (Ghadbian 2001, 626) 
Nevertheless, domestic respect is not the only reason why Bashar will follow his 
father‘s foreign policy. Other reasons affect this behaviour, and these include Syria‘s 
regional and international position. For Ghadbian the most important objectives of 
Syria‘s foreign policy are the peace talks with Israel, recovering the Golan Heights, 
Syria‘s regional and international power and its relations with the neighbouring Arab 
countries (Ghadbian 2001, 627). 
  This thesis is also advanced by Raymond Hinnebusch. He argues that unlike the 
other Arab states Syria did not bandwagon with the U.S.; instead it balanced against 
U.S. hegemon. This is due to Syria‘s regional role that has been created by Hafizel-
Assad. According to Hinnebusch, Hafiz has handed down his son not only a role to play 
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but ―a tradition of realpolitik that came out of years of experience coping with Syria‘s 
many more powerful enemies‖ (Hinnebusch 2010, 3). He explains that Syria‘s foreign 
policy is determined by its Arab nationalist identity. His greatest concern is the recovery 
of the Golan Heights from Israel. It is also concerned with balancing its power against 
Israel, to the West, and the United States in Iraq, to the East (Hinnebusch 2010, 5). He 
proceeds by explaining that Bashar‘s reaction to the pressure put on him by the U.S. 
was to build alliances with countries in the region and globally starting with Turkey 
(Hinnebusch 2010, 11).  
A different explanation of Syria‘s foreign policy choices has been presented by 
Marwan Kabalan. He argues that Syria‘s domestic needs shape its foreign policy, and 
that the external context has always closely affected its domestic policies as Syria has 
used its foreign policy to ―access resources needed for domestic security‖ (Kabalan 
2010, 27). For Kabalan, Bashar‘s foreign policy is a response to domestic needs directly 
linked to its security, especially in the geopolitical context (Kabalan 2010, 28). This was 
obvious in the friendly political and economic relations Bashar began to build with Iraq 
between 2000 and 2002 in exchange for Iraqi Oil. Of course Bashar was careful not to 
irritate the United States; he supplied the CIA with information on Islamic terrorists so 
the Bush administration wouldn‘t oppose the transfer of Iraqi oil to Syria (Kabalan 
2010, 31).  
Another explanation of Bashar‘s foreign policy is realpolitik. The case of his 
support of Iraq against the US invasion is a very important example. This attempt 
helped him in his strife to keep the balance of power with Israel. Bashar was certain that 
the war on Iraq was fought by the U.S. on behalf of Israel, so he was afraid that Syria 
will be in the middle of two hostile countries: Israel and pro-U.S. Iraq (Kabalan 2010, 
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32). This further proves the geopolitical theory behind Bashar‘s foreign policy 
decisions; in this case to keep the balance of power with neighbouring powerful 
countries. Moreover, Syria‘s geopolitical foreign policy is driven by its alliance with 
Iran which led to its disagreement with Saudi Arabia. Syria is not afraid of Iran‘s rising 
nuclear power and regional ambitions, as Saudi Arabia is. On the contrary it finds Iran a 
good ally against its more immediate neighbour and enemy, Israel (Kabalan 2010, 39). 
David Lesch explains that Bashar does not have full authority inside Syria but he 
gained control over Syria‘s foreign policy after the 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon and 
the exile of Abed El Halim Khaddam. Even though the links between Damascus and 
Beirut were cut, this allowed him to achieve ―ad-hoc responses‖ to external threats 
rather than having to operate in a long term policy as have been usually done (Lesch 
2010, 45).This is an example of a change in Bashar‘s foreign policy decisions according 
to the geopolitical change in the region. Lesch also argues that Bashar‘s support to 
Hizbullah and Hamas has nothing to do with Iran, noting the ideological differences 
between the two; they are rather cards to play with on the peace negotiations table with 
Israel (Lesch 2010, 45).  
 Eventually, according to Lesch, what Bashar is trying to do is to make Syria a 
regional moderator and a problem solver, hence his policy of mending relations with 
both the neighbouring countries and the west. This explains his non-reaction toward; the 
Mughniyeh assassination in 2008, the Israeli strike on the ‗nuclear sites‘ in 2007, and 
the United States‘ raid in October 2008.  
Alan Makovsky supports this argument and suggests that Bashar has used his 
father‘s firm grip in a more systematic way in Syria‘s foreign policy. Makovsky 
explains that Bashar eases the tensions with neighbouring countries – for example by 
17 
 
constructing friendly relations with Iraq, Turkey and Jordan – to focus on his two major 
concerns Israel and Lebanon (Makovsky 2001, 1). He increased trade with Baghdad, 
made several friendly visits to Turkey,  mended his relation with King Abdullah of 
Jordan, and has approached Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the same friendly intensions. 
However, these relations made the region more dangerous for the U.S. 
 After all, Bashar is still not planning to yield on the peace process with Israel 
and still supports Hizbullah (Makovsky 2001, 2). This view establishes how Bashar‘s 
policy is shaped by external threats to Syria‘s security, namely the United States‘ 
hegemony in the region. Makovsky fails to highlight how Syria‘s regional policy might 
affect the United States negatively. 
Anders Strindberg explained how the Syrian opposition to the U.S. invasion of 
Iraq, and its support for Hamas, has shaped the American hostile policy towards Syria 
and how the latter has used Lebanon to twist Syria‘s arm through the Syria 
Accountability Act. Like Hinnebusch, Strindberg explains that Syrians are the most 
loyally nationalistic population in the Arab region. This is partly due to their Arab 
nationalism that dates back to the early twentieth century, and partly to the political 
education of resistance imposed by the Syrian government. Strindberg also argues that 
in geographical terms Syrian population finds itself between two ―hotspots - the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and the U.S. occupation of Iraq‖ (Strindberg 
2004, 55). He argues that this popular and official sentiment explains Syria‘s foreign 
policy towards United States‘ occupation of Iraq, Israel‘s occupation of Palestine, and 
Hizbullah‘s support in Lebanon. Nonetheless these policies are what triggered the U.S. 
to formulate the Syria Accountability Act in May 2004. 
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According to President Bush in an interview to the Egyptian Al-Ahram in May, 
―the Syrians will not fight terror and they won't join us in fighting terror" (Al-Ahram 
2004). This is despite the fact that Syria has been very cooperative with the U.S. 
regarding the fight against terrorism since 9/11, by allowing the CIA to establish office 
in Syria and giving them valuable information about individuals having links with al 
Qaeda. In the same line of cooperation with the United States, Syria has made efforts to 
control its borders with Iraq, and this has been unofficially acknowledged by U.S. 
officials in Syria (Strindberg 2004, 60). 
Bassel Salloukh examines how Lebanon was used as the card for the U.S. 
interest in the region. He explains that the suspicious control of Lebanon by Syria was 
the reason behind Hafiz el-Assad‘s regional power since it was used to enforce Syria‘s 
regional power. Hafiz and Bashar realized that the survival of the Baath‘s regime is 
linked to the latter‘s ―role in its immediate environment‖ (Salloukh 2009, 
159).Salloukh‘s explanation of Syrian foreign policy encompasses several variables one 
of which is the balance-of-power. This is the basis of Bashar‘s foreign policy choices 
which are formed according to external threats to Syria‘s security, mainly U.S. 
hegemony and the Israeli threat.  
Other arguments are at the domestic level; i.e. political economy, regime 
legitimacy, regime security and sectarian. The political economy theory is the realist 
way to explain Syria‘s new liberal economic orientation, and its enhanced relationship 
with the East being a new market free of Western conditions. Regime legitimacy theory 
explains that Syria‘s ruling regime which is a sectarian minority, in its goal to reach 
local legitimacy, assumes an Arab nationalist ideology. This argument is negated by 
Salloukh by saying that all peace negotiations with Israel failed not because of Hafiz or 
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Bashar, but on Israel‘s behalf.Sectarian argument highlights the Alawi identity of the 
ruling regime in Syria which identifies with Iran and Hizbullah as part of the Shi‘ite 
crescent. However Salloukh argues that this theory does not explain Syria‘s support for 
the Sunni group Hamas, and does not explain Syria‘s policy towards the invasion of 
Iraq.Regime security theory assumes that Syria‘s foreign policy decisions are made 
based on its assessment of the external threats on its survival (Salloukh 2009, 161).
  
Another popular explanation of Syria‘s foreign policy choices looks at Bashar‘s 
inexperience and miscalculations which led to Syria‘s regional and international 
isolation. Theorists such as Eyal Zisser and Dennis Ross, base their arguments on 
Bashar‘s miscalculation which grounded on the neo-conservative assumption that states 
will bandwagon when facing a stronger military power like the United States. 
(Salloukh, 2009, 161)  However, this was not the case with Syria after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein. 
The realist theory best explains Syria‘s behaviour which is balancing as opposed 
to bandwagoning. What helped Syria resist the U.S. threats to its geopolitical interests 
in the region is its foreign policy of ―classical balancing, asymmetrical balancing and 
balking‖ (Salloukh 2009, 162).Bashar el-Assad‘s choices regarding his foreign policy 
towards Iraq and Lebanon are based on the balancing theory and regime security not his 
miscalculations, since Syria considered the invasion of Iraq as a direct threat to its 
geopolitical interest thus to the regime security (Salloukh 2009, 163). 
The same threat was seen by Syria in US and European intervention in Lebanon 
through resolution 1559. Lebanon was used ―as a beachhead against Syria‖ to weaken 
its geopolitical influence. Making Syria lose control over Lebanon and Hizbullah, and 
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spoiling its alliance with Iran, will push Syria to accept U.S. domination over the 
region, offer its assistance to the U.S. in Iraq and stop obstructing the peace 
process(Salloukh 2009, 167). 
One of the authors who explain Syria‘s policies in its quest for regime 
legitimacy is Mordechai Kedar. He argues that the ruling regime attempts to construct 
its identity in order to legitimize itself by encouraging the ―spirit of resistance‖. Kedar 
uses legitimacy to explain Syria‘s foreign policy, arguing that the conflict with Israel is 
what legitimizes El-Assad‘s rule and diverts the attention from internal problems. 
Consequently, Bashar‘s determination to recover all of the Golan Heights is actually 
intended to hinder the peace process and to blame it on Israel which leads to the 
persistence of the state of war thus legitimizing the regime. Also Kedar argues that 
when Assad enters in peace negotiations they are also linked legitimizing the regime by 
returning the Golan Heights (Hinnebusch 2010, 396).  
The above theories explain the geopolitical drive behind Bashar el-Assad‘s 
hostile foreign policy decisions towards the United States in relation to Lebanon and 
Iraq. Fred Lawson provides a different angle to explain Syria‘s foreign policy, which is 
the policy of brotherhood with neighbouring countries. He explains Syria‘s relation with 
Iran by emphasizing the importance of Glenn Snyder‘s ‗alliance dilemma‘(Lawson 
2007, 29).  
The alliance dilemma, based on the realist explanation of foreign policies 
between states occurs when one partner assumes a reasonably hostile stand towards an 
opponent the other is likely to take initiatives and engage both of them in an unwanted 
clash. However, when one assumes an extremely hostile stand towards an opponent the 
other side is inclined to hold back in order not to engage in a general war. Similarly, 
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when one partner embraces a reasonable approach towards an opponent the other tends 
to take pre-emptive measures by shifting. But when one takes extremely pacifying steps 
towards an opponent the other is more likely to reinforce the alliance (Snyder 1997, 
182).  
 Lawson suggests that Damascus‘s policy towards regional rivals is directly 
affected by its relation with Tehran. However to understand its connection with Syria‘s 
foreign policy towards Turkey, Iraq and Israel, Lawson reformulates Snyder‘s alliance 
dilemma. He suggests that the important issue is to differentiate between moderate 
hostility and severe hostility in a state‘s relation with rivals. Reasonable hostility is like 
Syria‘s deteriorating relationship with Turkey in the end of the 1980s, whichmade Iran 
take more hostile action which is its reinforced activity in Lebanon, which leads Syria to 
the risk of entrapment in an undesirable clash. Lawson describes the relationship 
between rival states as ―U-shaped, rather than monotonic‖; while ―standing more and 
more firm vis-à-vis and adversary does not generate greater and greater incentives for 
allies to undertake risky initiates‖ (Lawson 2007, 33). 
Most Scholars have tried to explain Syria‘s foreign policy and the affecting 
constituents which play a major role in shaping it. Using the realist theory of balance of 
power, this chapter pinpoints the most important factors playing this role. Syria‘s 
foreign policy emancipates out of its role in the regional Middle Eastern politics and 
sets it in the middle of the Arab Israeli conflict. Due to this fact, Syria‘s foreign policy 
engineers mainly Hafiz and later on Bashar have strived to keep their policies towards 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Golan Heights in check to win over their people. As 
highlighted above, Syria‘s foreign policy stems out of the need to keep rallying the 
Syrian population with its governing system. Syria has also aligned itself with Iran in 
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order to protect itself against the U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region especially 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, Syria has made sure not to cut the 
umbilical cord with the states completely since it needs to leverage its economic 
survival through Iraq and as a way to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights. The 
next chapter will take a look at Hafiz el-Assad‘s foreign policies and how his son 
Bashar has maintained some and changed others. 
 
2.4 - Hafiz el-Assad’s Foreign Policy Choices: Its Continuation or Change under 
Bashar 
During his rule, Hafiz el-Assad dedicated more attention to foreign 
policy than to internal affairs. Even Syrians who criticize his authoritarian rule 
admit that he was a ―master player in the regional and international arenas, 
skilfully extracting the maximum returns from often unpromising 
circumstances‖ (George 2003, 17). Hafiz had always pursued control over 
Syria‘s direct neighbours, formerly ―Greater Syria‖. Even when he didn‘t 
succeed he had been efficient in obstructing the plans of others in that regard.  
He also pursued relations with the Gulf countries, for economic aid 
reasons. Likewise good relations with Egypt, the largest and most populated 
country in the region, were sought since 1989. Even though these relations 
were severed by Damascus for 10 years after Anwar el Sadat signed the peace 
treaty with Israel in 1979. Hafiz el-Assad even pursued friendly relations with 
Iran after the Islamic revolution in 1979, which was based on their common 
hatred towards Israel and the West (George 2003, 18). 
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The Arab Israeli conflict was the main concern of Hafiz el-Assad, 
which he tried to control through his regional policies. Under his regime‘s rule, 
he developed the idea that Syria is responsible for maintaining the balance of 
power against Israeli supremacy in the Levant. Smaller Arab countries like 
Lebanon and Palestine were better off accepting Syrian guidance in the Israeli 
conflict and peace process.  
Hafiz‘s regional ties with bigger Arab countries like Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia guaranteed Syria a ‗political-strategic depth‘ in order not be secluded 
because of its role in the conflict. Thus Syria enjoyed the foreign aid and 
investment of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The three countries Syria, Saudi 
Arabia, and Egypt coordinated their policies to a certain extend through the 
1990s in order to control the Arab League (Perthes 2001, 37). 
As for Syrian foreign policy on the international level, Hafiz el-Assad 
based his relations with the West on his interest in the Middle East. Until the 
end of 1980 Syria enjoyed a progressive relationship with the Soviet Union 
with a purpose of opposing the West‘s indefinite support for Israel. This 
relationship included receiving several Soviet military and civilian experts, and 
signing in 1987 the Treaty of friendship and cooperation. However, Hafiz 
never allowed Soviet bases on Syrian soils and always kept relations open with 
the US. His foreign policy decisions were ―based on a realistic analysis of the 
world Syria faced, and were typified by pragmatism and relative moderation‖ 
(Zisser 2007, 10).  
This policy was best reflected with Hafiz‘s reaction after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, where he responded by elevating his relationship with the 
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United States even though he realized that it wouldn‘t be very useful because 
of Washington‘s strong support for Israel. Similarly, Hafiz improved his 
relation with the European Union because he realized that it would be a fairer 
moderator than the U.S. in the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a further step towards 
that end Damascus became part of the Barcelona Process in 1995, which had 
economic and political cooperation between the European and the 
Mediterranean countries (George 2003, 18). 
Hafiz‘s intended to improve relations with the United States through 
joining the U.S. led coalition in the Gulf war in 1990. Another part is his 
joining the Middle East peace process showing, for the first time in 1991, his 
willingness to sign a peace agreement with Israel. At the same time Hafiz still 
maintained good relations with Iran, also renewed his relations with Iraq 
(Zisser 2007, 13).  
Hafiz el-Assad had expertly sought a delicate foreign policy that lead to 
making Syria a central player in the regional affairs. He controlled Lebanon 
and the Palestinian factions; he pressured Israel through Hizbullah without 
engaging in any military struggle in the Golan. He had close relations with the 
Soviet Union and still sustained connections with the U.S. who recognized 
Syria as a crucial player in the region.  
That Syria backed the Maronite community against the Moslem-
Palestinian alliance in Lebanon, Tehran against Baghdad and dissident 
Palestinians against Yasser Arafat‘s PLO while retaining pan-Arab 
credentials is, if nothing else, a tribute to Hafiz el-Assad‘s remarkable 
tactical skills. (ICG 2004)  
 
However, looking at Bashar‘s foreign policy and comparing it to Hafiz‘s one 
cannot but realize that it hasn‘t always been a continuation of the latter‘s policies. 
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Bashar‘s foreign policy choices are best explained as reactions to his geopolitical 
context of the region. This is an important angle to look at since Bashar is not deviating 
from his father‘s foreign policy, but rather responding to new geopolitical challenges.  
 Bashar has taken two new paths in his foreign policy decision making. On one 
hand, he has maintained the same relations with countries like Iran and Israel. While on 
the other hand, he has taken totally new measures in his relation with countries like 
Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. This is explained by the geopolitical changes or status quo 
in the region. Based on this, the argument is that the geopolitical context drives Bashar 
to either alter his father‘s foreign policy or maintain them. It is very important to take 
into consideration the change of the Middle Eastern players and political environment 
between Bashar el-Assad‘s time and that of Hafiz el- Assad‘s. New political and even 
geo-political changes have happened in the region and especially in the last 10 years. 
The two foreign policies will be assessed in this regards. 
 
2.5 – Conclusion 
 
 This chapter argues that realism best explains both Hafiz and Bashar el-Assad‘s 
foreign policy. By examining the cases of Iran, Turkey, and Israel in the next chapter, 
this thesis will reveal how Bashar el-Assad was able to maintain Hafiz‘s foreign policy 
towards these countries because of the unchanging regional status quo after his 
inheritance of the presidency.Moreover, by maintaining this policy Bashar managed to 
keep Syria as a central player in the region as his father had planned and achieved. 
Factors like balance of power, regime security are behind Syrian foreign policy choices.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE REALIST SCHOOL IN SYRIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
3.1 - Introduction 
President Hafiz el-Assad formulated three different foreign policy strategies 
based on the type of relationship he wanted to create with the opposing country. The 
―diplomacy of power‖ which he applied to the Palestinian and Lebanese oppositions, 
the ―pacifying diplomacy‖ when he allied with the West in the second Gulf War, as well 
as when he when he put an end to the Turkish crisis with the Adana agreement in 1998, 
and the ―edge diplomacy‖ by allying with Iran in the first Gulf War (Fayad 2000, 126).  
 The strategic planning of Syrian Foreign policy since its independence is based 
on liberating the Arab occupied territories, regaining the rights of the Palestinian 
people, and assuring Arab cooperation to achieve these goals. Syrian diplomatic efforts 
were initiated based on its key understanding of its role in the region by acting as a 
balancing power between the regional and international players. By trying to maintain 
good relations with its regional neighbours, Syria strived on its cooperative policy with 
other Arab states. Also, Syria has dwelt on keeping cooperation channels open with 
other international states such as Latin American countries, US, Russia, India, and 
China, and especially Iran and turkey in order to make sure they are not secluded as an 
international player (Ammoura 2010, 2). 
 Hafiz‘s plan was to empower the rest of the Arab world with Iraq and Iran both 
as important strategic players. However, Saddam Hussein failed to adhere to this plan 
with when he waged war on Iran and his invaded of Kuwait (Ammoura 2010, 3).  
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 This chapter will discuss how Bashar el-Assad has maintained his father‘s 
strategy in his relation with three countries Iran, Turkey and Israel. His strategy was 
born out of his need to sustain Syria‘s strategically powerful position in the Middle East 
and as a part of the strategy to balance the power of Israel in the region.  
 
3.2 - The Strategic Partnership with Iran 
 Bashar el-Assad has on several occasions expressed how important it is for 
Damascus to keep a strong relation with Tehran as part of Syria‘s regional plan to 
strengthen its role as a key player in the region. In an interview with Charlie Rose on 
May 26
th
 2010, Bashar el-Assad stated the following: 
―Normally you should have good relations with your neighbors, something 
we‘ve learned from our experience during the last decades.  We‘ve been in 
conflict, Syria and Turkey, Iraq and Turkey, and other countries.  What did we 
get?  Nothing.  We‘ve been losing for decades.  We have learned here in the last 
decade that we have to turn the tide, so everybody is going for good relations 
with the other, even if he doesn‘t have the same vision or they—even if they 
disagree about most of the things, not some things.  So, this relation, Syria/Iraq, 
we are neighbors.  Syria/Turkey, we are neighbors.  We‘ll affect each other 
directly.  Iran is not my neighbor, but at the end, Iran is one of the big countries 
in the Middle East, and it‘s an important country, and it plays a role and affects 
different issues in the region.  So, if you want to play a role and help yourself 
and save your interests, you should have good relations with all these influential 
countries.  That‘s why this relation, I think, is very normal.‖ 
(www.charlierose.com) 
 
The Syrian-Iranian alliance is probably one of the most durable alliances in the 
region. After overthrowing the Iranian monarchy in 1979, the secular Arab nationalist 
Syria and the Islamic Iran formed close relations that led to a formal alliance which has 
lasted to this day. This alliance was due to direct threats from Iraq, Israel and the US 
from the 1980s onward (Goodarzi 2006, 2). 
Even though Syria and Iran have no common ideological beliefs; nevertheless, 
they are uniting their efforts to achieving influence over the region. According to many 
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experts on Middle Eastern relations, the Syrian- Iranian partnerships results from their 
geopolitical reality. It has been quoted as ― a marriage of convenience‖ though in earlier 
times it was believed to be an opportunistic alliance against the threat of Iraq. Ilan 
Berman was among those who considered that both Syria and Iran have a common goal, 
which is not to be the next Iraq (Goodarzi 2006, 3). 
This strategic partnership started with Hafiz el-Assad during 1970s and reached 
its climaxed when Syria sided with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s resulting in a 
wider fracture between Saddam‘s and el-Assad‘s Baathism. However, in the 1990s this 
partnership weakened when each country was pursuing its own interest. Syria was 
immensely involved in the Middle East peace process and in regaining the Golan 
Heights while in the meantime Iran had an alternative strategy in approaching the 
matter. Their relationship was idyllic until the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 which led 
them to sign a joint defence agreement. 
 Iran sends millions of dollars in donations to Damascus every year, and it 
supported Syria against the international boycott after the Hariri Assassination in 2005. 
Syria and Iran see themselves as partners against Israel, US and Iraq; the opposition 
against them is what unifies them. ―They have diverging interests when things are good 
in the region but when things deteriorate; they have obvious reasons to come together.‖ 
(Pan 2006, 15) 
The relationship between Syria and Iran has had a great impact on both their 
foreign policies and on the Middle East. Some of these decisions included the 1982 
Iran-Iraq war where Syria closed down the pipeline preventing it from reaching the 
Mediterranean. This played a major role in re-balancing the war outcome in favour of 
the Iranians causing the Iraqi great financial grievances.  
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Another important Syrian support backup of Iran‘s interest which led to a 
deterioration of the Jordanian-Syrian relations was the support of Jordan to Iraq in the 
1980s. Syria‘s stand has cost her the stalemate her stand has created with its 
neighbouring country Jordan. This also contributed in almost freezing the Arab-Israeli 
peace process. Third, the fact that Syria overcame Arab and specifically Saudi-Arabia‘s 
pressure against its partnership with Iran, has increased Syria‘s weight in its role in the 
region. Fourth, Syria‘s support for Iran‘s activities in Lebanon is against Israeli, French 
and American interests, thus has shaped the former‘s relation with these three countries 
accordingly. Finally, Syria‘s continued support for Iran in spite of the bad relations 
between Moscow and Tehran has proved that Syria can proceed with its regional 
politics without the Russia (Hirschfeld 1986, 105). 
Until the early 1980s, the relationship between Iran and Syria had a different 
weight for each respective country. For Iran, their relationship with Syria had a strategic 
importance though they had to keep their foreign policies in check as not to disrupt 
conflict of interest with Syria.  As for Syria at the time, they saw an interest in this 
alliance since it had fruitful outcomes in the future. They wanted to map out future 
gains from the alliance in order to keep the balance of power in the region in check. 
(Hirschfeld 1986, 106).  
This became evident when Iran used Syrian military and diplomatic support after 
the Iranian militants‘ hold of the US embassy in Tehran which led to deterioration in 
US-Iranian relations. Also after Saddam‘s invasion of Iran,Syrian efforts helped Tehran 
out of a regional isolation and Arab unity against it. However, the balance shifted to the 
other side when Syria needed Iranian assistance in 1982 to mobilize Shiites in Lebanon 
against Israeli forces.  
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After the cessation of hostilities with Israeli troops in 1985, it was Damascus‘ 
turn again in backing Iran against its regional isolation due to its war with Iraq until 
1988 (Goodarzi 2006, 5).This relation went through turmoil in 1988 when Iran 
supported Hizbullah in its battle against the pro-Syria Amal movement Lebanon. This 
interference was limited and after negotiations between Tehran and Damascus, the 
fighting ended. Furthermore, Syria took a pacifying stand with Hizbullah to conserve 
the latter‘s support for its future strategy in Lebanon and reinforce its relation with Iran 
to deter its regional enemies (Goodarzi 2006, 227).  
Syrian-Iranian relations remained strong remained throughout the 1990s and into 
the 20
th
 century and culminating it in an agreement signed by both the defence ministers 
of both countries in June 2006. The agreement was aimed against the ‗common threats‘ 
Israel and the United States. After the conference, Iranian defence minister said that Iran 
―considers Syria's security its own security, and we consider our defence capabilities to 
be those of Syria‖ (Pouladi 2006). 
Iran has also emphasized its support to Hizbullah by visiting Syria after the 
former‘s attack and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers in July 2006. Noting that Hizbullah 
receives 100$ million per year from Tehran, as well as weapons are sent through Syria 
into the Lebanese borders (Pan 2006). 
Despite Iran‘s support for Syria, yet it did not realign with Iraq during the 
American campaign for the War in 2003 as its partner, Syria, did. Observers predicted 
that the Iranian republic was planning to support the US in its quest of overthrowing 
Saddam Hussein same as it did in the war on Taliban in Afghanistan. To that end 
Tehran received a KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) delegation in September 2002 
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and arranged a meeting for them with the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in 
Iraq to manage imminent plans in Iraq. 
Later in December of the same year, in a conference organised in London Jalal 
Talibani, the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, stated that ―Iran is a great 
neighbour which has always supported the Iraqi opposition, and some sort of 
understanding between Iran and the United states, direct or indirect, would be a great 
help in the liberation of Iraq‖ (Muir 2002). 
Syria strategic alliance with Iraq was strengthened rather than weaken after the 
Bush administration launched its war on Iraq in April 2003. Despite the fact that Syria 
backed Iran and Turkey on that matter, and it suspected that Iran coordinated with the 
United States its policy towards Iraq. Furthermore, the relations between Syria and 
Hizbullah, Iran‘s ally in Lebanon strengthened greatly following the U.S. operation in 
Iraq (Lawson 2007, 38).  
Syria has been accused of cooperating with Iran on its nuclear program. In June 
2008, the British Guardian wrote that ―the Iranians were involved in the Syrian 
program. The idea was that the Syrians produce plutonium and the Iranians get their 
share; eventhough Syria had no reprocessing facility for the spent fuel‖ (Farrar-
Wellman and Frasco 2010). 
Syria and Iran both negated these accusations however an Israeli air strike 
destroyed the facility before International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could verify 
the accusations. Israel accused Syria of assisting Iran avert attention from its nuclear 
program by spreading rumours of war with Israel.  Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister 
Danny Ayalon said he hopes that ―Syria will not let itself get carried away by the 
bellicose statements of Iran‖ (Farrar-Wellman and Frasco 2010).  
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 On another level Syria and Iran have emphasized their partnership in a joint 
press conference in February 2010, on Al Jazeera, after signing an agreement of 
cancelling the visa restrictions to each other‘s countries. Both Bashar el-Assad and 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defended their 30 year old strong ties by explaining that United 
States is not supposed to decide the relationships in the Middle East.  
When asked about Hillary Clinton‘s comments about Washington‘s concern 
about Syria‘s relationship with Iran, he replied by: ―We hope that others don't give us 
lessons about our region and our history, we are the ones who decide how matters will 
go and we know our interests. We thank them for their advice‖ (Al Jazeera 2010). 
While Ahmadinejad called for the US to ―pack up‖ and leave the Middle East, 
by saying: ―(The Americans) want to dominate the region but they feel Iran and Syria 
are preventing that, we tell them that instead of interfering in the region's affairs, to pack 
their things and leave‖ (Al Jazeera 2010).  
 President el-Assad made it clear in this press conference that he won‘t change 
his long-term partnership with Iran when asked about Clinton‘s demand for Syria to 
move away from Iran. ―We must have understood Clinton wrong because of bad 
translation or our limited understanding, so we signed the agreement to cancel the 
visas‖ he said (Al Jazeera 2010). 
 The relations of Syria and Iran are still growing stronger with time due to their 
common interest to balance out the United States‘ meddling in the affairs of the Middle 
East especially after 2003 invasion of Iraq. Both countries are always emphasizing their 
deep rooted foreign policy ties as they are facing the same hegemon. Their relationship 
which started with Hafiz el-Assad and survived the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian revolution 
and even the invasion of Iraq has proved to work for both sides. Iran has allied itself 
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with the Arab Syria as a means to win herself a strategic partner in the Arab world and 
revitalize their interests in the region especially since Syria is the connection between 
Hizbullah and Iran. Syria, on the other hand, has played their cards smart by finding a 
rather powerful ally in the region to support it economically due to its secluded position 
especially after the 2005 assassination of Rafic el Hariri. Syria down plays its foreign 
policy in the Middle East by having a more diplomatic approach towards the case of 
Iraq for example. Though, they had opposed the Iraqi invasion of 2003, yet they have 
cooperated with the Americans to rid them of Islamic insurgencies. Both countries have 
tried to seek to maximize their interests with all the key players in the region while 
trying to protect their strong alliance. Their marriage is based on mutual interest without 
the possibility of a conflict of interest and same-fate strategy. If opportunities arise for 
either any of the two countries, the other turns a blind eye as to not affect their mutual 
interests. Their foreign policy is more of protective policy of each other without 
eliminating one sided interests when the need arises.  
 
3.3 - Maintaining the Friendship with Turkey 
 
 Syrian-Turkish relations have always been characterized of relatively quiet but 
not absent of tensions. This is due to the presence of severe conflicts of interest between 
the two countries related to border issues, problems pertaining to water and river rights - 
Euphrates River waters, political orientation, religious stance, smuggling, drug-
trafficking, and terrorism. The mere fact of border build-up and internal security forces 
on the Turkish side proves how serious these problems are. However, the two 
governments renounced obvious aggression, their relations developed closely in the 
1980s in comparison to the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1987 to 1990 period Syria and 
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Turkey improved their cultural and economic ties but their attitude towards political 
affairs remained mixed (Pipes, 1989). 
During the early 1950s Turkey adopted a pro-Western position and tried to enrol 
Syria in a Western oriented regional alliance. By the mid-1950s relations between the 
two states deteriorated because Syria adopted a pro-Arab regional policy firmly backed 
by the Soviet Union, thus enhancing the difference in foreign policy orientation with 
Western Turkey. However, the trend of minimizing the differences start with Turkey in 
the 1960s when it decided to stop it‘s offensive and enforcing attitude towards 
neighbouring countries and adopted a policy of ―rapprochement and reconciliation‖ 
instead. In the 1970s Syria started responding to Turkey‘s attitude and found it 
beneficial to assume a cooperative attitude with its neighbour as well (Yaniv 1986, 99). 
Turkish-Syrian relation changed due to in international politics. The collapse of 
the Cold War blocs eliminated an important cause of the friction between the two states 
leading to normal ties between them. The Turkish-Syrian conflict had more than 
regional aspect to it, there was a superpower aspect. As well as the relation between 
Ankara and Damascus was a confrontation between two alliances; the Syrian-Soviet and 
the Turkish-American (Yarvin 1989, 100).  
The Syrian government was resolutely anti-American. It played an active role to 
obstruct US efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict until it cooperated with the US in the 
Kuwaiti crisis in 1990. Also Turkey is Russia‘s long-lasting foe, it is US‘s formal ally 
and a member of NATO. Whenever Syria performed an action against Turkey, it was 
within the Russian umbrella and at the convenience of Moscow. When Turkey acted in 
an offensive way towards Syria, it would be under American patronage and to 
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demonstrate to the US that it is a strong ally capable of handling its own security (Pipes, 
1989). 
 However, the turning point in Syrian-Turkish relations was in October 1998. At 
that time it was very probable for the two countries to engage in an armed conflict when 
Turkey suspected that Syria was harbouring Kurdish rebels against the Turkish regime. 
Then Turkey deployed around 10,000 troops along the Syrian border and its chief of 
general staff declared that ―the current situation is that of an undeclared war‖. However 
this was deterred by President Hafiz el-Assad declaring that it was still keen on good 
relations with Turkey (Lawson 1998, 180).  
Both countries signed the Adana agreement on October 20
th
 1998 in which Syria 
agreed on; recognizing the PKK as a terrorist organization, ceasing to allow its activities 
on its territory as well as establishing training camps, also preventing PKK members 
form using Syria for travel outside. Syria also agreed on preventing PKK leaders from 
entering Syrian territories. 
Thus Syria‘s responded to the Turkish aggression by deporting Abdullah 
Ocalan, the PKK‘s leader, from Damascus and to ban Kurdish militants from 
penetrating the country by incorporating a better surveillance system. This was followed 
by shutting down PKK ―training facilities‖ in Syria and Lebanon by 1999. Ankara and 
Damascus created a joint Security Committee including high ranking army officers 
from both sides in charge of solving tactical and strategic disputes. Along the same 
lines, Turkey encouraged Syria to send an economic commission to examine prospects 
of commercial and industrial collaboration. By mid-March 1999, Syria had sent its 
deputy prime minister for economic affairs to follow up on that matter, which was 
concluded with an announcement stating that ―the two countries will exert all possible 
36 
 
efforts to raise and diversify bilateral trade, they agreed to exchange visits by mercantile 
and economic delegation to review the potential of establishing a private council for 
businessmen in both countries‖ (Lawson 1998, 182). 
With Bashar el-Assad assuming the presidency in Syria in June 2000, relations 
between the two countries assumed new levels. Several steps between the two countries 
were taken in an attempt to revitalize the relations between the two countries. A meeting 
between the Governor of Aleppo and a Turkish commission took place to found the 
formal discussion between the two countries. Within a few months, Turkey started to 
increase its trade with the Syrian government (Lawson 1998, 183).   
Turkey sent Minister of Economy RecepOnal leading a delegation of one 
hundred Turkish businessmen to reinitiate the joint Economic Commission in May 
2000. By November the foreign Ministers of both Syria and Turkey met in Doha to 
finalize a ―memorandum of understanding‖ that was supposed to bring the two 
countries together. Furthermore, in January 2001, Syrian military officers met with 
Turkish officers in Ankara to further stabilize the relations between the two. In March 
same year, the Minister of electricity of Syria declared that there will be integration of 
Syria‘s Electrical grip with that of Turkey‘s and Lebanon. By September that year, the 
Ministers of Interior signed a common security agreement. According to this agreement 
the two governments will fight terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, drug trade, and 
illegal immigration, together (Lawson 2007, 35). 
In 2002, General Hassan el Turkmani Syria‘s Chief of Staff, met with his 
Turkish counterpart in Ankara to initiate an agreement of better collaboration regarding 
military manufacturing. Other agreements created better bilateral trade and investment. 
This collaboration climaxed with dialogues between Turkey‘s Prime Minister Abdullah 
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Gül and President Bashar el-Assad in Damascus in January 2003. These discussions led 
to signing a ―crisis management pact‖ regarding war on Iraq. Turkey and Syria later 
organized a regional conference in Istanbul to sponsor foreign policy collaboration 
between six states to face US allegations of military attacks on Iraq (Lawson 2007, 36). 
The leadership change from Hafiz el-Assad to his son, Bashar resulted in an 
improved relation with Turkey mainly because of Bashar‘s more open domestic policy. 
This led to a redefining of the Turkish-Syrian relations with a dismissal of their cultural 
difference resulting in expanded bilateral agreements (Altuniski and Tur 2006, 218). 
Bashar‘s regional strategy to improve Syria‘s relations with its neighbouring 
countries included better relations with Turkey. In return, Turkey was very enthusiastic 
about this new-born cooperative stand with Syria mainly shown through the mutual 
official visits. Bashar‘s first visit of the Turkish capital happened in 2004 which marked 
the first visit of any Syrian President to Ankara in modern times. (Altuniski and Tur 
2006, 226) 
Turkey‘s interest from these events rested mainly in newly gained security. 
―Also, having good relations with Syria was in line with the Ecevit government‘s 
―regionally based foreign policy‖, which argued that Turkey should develop good 
relations in all regions independent of its ties with the West‖. Thus, improved relations 
with Damascus had a great effect on Ankara‘s relations with the Arab countries and 
empowered Turkey‘s influence in the Middle East. Moreover, this was accompanied by 
Turkey‘s interest of having economic ties with Syria (Altuniski and Tur 2006, 227). 
In the aftermath of the Iraq war in 2003, a common concern between the two 
countries emerged; this was the establishment of a Kurdish state. This fear on the Syrian 
part is due to the Kurdish community amounting to 9% of the Syrian population. This 
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fear was further emphasized by the riots in March 2005 within the Kurdish areas. Also 
on the Turkish part, the idea of the creation of a Kurdish state in north Iraq is of great 
concern. The increase of violence with the PKK after the stop of the ceasefire with the 
PKK in 2004 made it already a sensitive case for Turkey (Altuniski and Tur 2006, 229). 
During Bashar‘s visit to Turkey in July 2005, he expressed in an interview with 
Middle East News Agency that there are ―common views and threats perceptions within 
Syria and Turkey in relation to Iraq.‖ He also agreed with the Turkish statement that the 
establishment of a Kurdish state is intolerable and is a ―red-line‖ for Turkey. He 
expressed that ―a Kurdish state would violate our red line too‖ (Altuniski and Tur 2006, 
229). 
In December 2009, the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council held a 
meeting in Damascus which Recep Tayyip Erdogan attended. During this meeting Syria 
and Turkey signed 51 agreements, memos of understanding and work programs on 
cooperation between the two countries in all areas (Turkish Weekly, Oct 2010). 
Syria‘s rapprochement of Turkey was meant to solace threats from Israel. In July 
2006 the chief foreign policy adviser of Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus to boost 
President Assad‘s constructive role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Also Turkey assured 
Damascus that it will not be part of any Israeli military campaign against Syria. With 
Turkey‘s adoption of an anti-American policy, Syria is empowering its ties with Ankara 
to end the isolation enforced on it by the US. On the other hand, Turkey sees in Syria its 
gate to the Middle East due to their common borders. Also, one of Turkey‘s most 
imminent concerns is the situation in Iraq, and the PKK using the Kurdish controlled 
areas in Iraq to pose a threat on Turkey. Syria‘s support on that matter is of great use to 
Turkey.   
39 
 
In an interview with Al Nahar in October 2010, President Bashar el-Assad 
commented on how Syria and Turkey had common interest in weakening the Kurds in 
Iraq: 
―No… we are against all separatist forces in Iraq in any direction they take… 
we are against the fragmenting of Iraq… our main concern after the invasion is 
Iraq‘s unity… it‘s number one… Iraq‘s unity and Arabism… all other issues are 
side issues or details,‖ stressing that if unity and Arabism aren‘t resolved then 
nothing will be solved, noting that separatism exists in more than one party and 
not just Kurds. ―We stood against all separatist thoughts through what we did, 
we and Turkey and Iran,‖ (Al Nahar Oct 10, 2010) 
 
On October 2010, the Turkish weekly has published that both Bashar el-Assad 
and Erdogan are satisfied with the level of Turkish-Syrian relations. It notes that:  
Presidents el-Assad and Erdogan expressed the readiness of Syria and Turkey to 
help in forming an Iraqi government capable of improving the internal situation, 
achieving national reconciliation and unity among all spectrums of the Iraqi 
people, and improves relations with neighbouring countries (Turkish Weekly 
October 12, 2010). 
 
 The improvements in bilateral relations between Ankara and Damascus include 
flourishing economic transactions, expanding governmental connections, and 
strengthened military and security cooperation. This improvement is the result of 
Syria‘s acknowledgment that it cannot be at war with its powerful neighbour, especially 
with Turkey‘s partnership with Israel. At the same time, when Turkey feels that it is too 
weak to make use of Syria‘s concessions, Damascus has left itself open to Ankara 
economically and militarily (Lawson 1986, 199). 
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3.4 - Israel and Syria: Contending Neighbours? 
In his inaugural speech of June 2000, Basharel-Assad has stressed his father‘s 
position regarding the peace agreement with Israel, and he stated his willingness to 
resume peace talks.  
As far as we are concerned, we have stressed on many occasions that peace in 
our region will not be achieved until we restore our occupied land; and that 
many of the problems that have appeared recently find their solution in 
providing the opportunities for just peace, which removes the causes of tension, 
conflict, frustration and disappointment. 
We stress that we are prepared for negotiations without any preconditions in 
accordance with the Madrid terms of reference. In other words, we resume from 
the point we stopped at in the early 1990s (syria-alassad.org 2005). 
 
The Arab- Israeli conflict is the enduring struggle in Syria‘s foreign policy. 
Since Israel occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, Syria‘s main aim is to retrieve those 
occupied territories. On his part, Hafiz el-Assad has always believed that negotiations 
combined with great military power and Arab unity are the best tool in the struggle with 
Israel (Korany and Dessouki 1991, 379).  
 Though after the 1973 war, Hafiz tried to negotiate a peaceful agreement with 
Israel under the patronage of the United States, these negotiations failed. The failure of 
mediation convinced Hafiz that he cannot undertake this track without a military and 
political equilibrium with their rival Israel. Thus he obstructed any American attempt on 
this matter based on Israel‘s terms. Hafiz el-Assad believed that the Arabs had the time 
before reaching a peace agreement with Israel since modernization only makes the 
Arabs stronger, meanwhile the Arab states should maintain their military struggle. Israel 
as well is not keen to attain peace with Syria since the latter is incapable of hindering 
Israel‘s on-going quest in the region. Both countries were managing a ―deterrence 
relationship‖ since they both knew they had ―more to lose then to gain by resort to war‖ 
(Korany and Dessouki 1991, 380). 
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  Hafiz el-Assad assumed a two-track strategy after the 1973 war; on the one 
hand exhausting his military option and on the other hand the use of diplomacy in 
regaining the Golan Heights and other Arab occupied territories, plus achieving the 
national rights of the Palestinians. El-Assad had gone through improving its relation 
with Washington especially 1988, during which the US emerged as the only superpower 
after the defeat of the Soviet Union. This rapprochement involved Syria opening to 
better relations with Israel by adopting UN resolutions 242 and 338 (peace in return for 
territories). Also by beginning 1989 Syria started mending relations with Egypt, the 
only Arab country who had signed a peace agreement with Israel. In July 1990 Hafiz 
visited Cairo for the first time in thirteen years, and argues that ―We are ready to join 
the peace process and we accept UN resolutions 242 and 338 and we still call for a just 
and comprehensive peace‖.  However, all throughout these years Syrian leaders still 
portrayed, in their media, Israel as a ―Neo-Nazi government‖ (Ma‘oz 1995, 201-204). 
 Hafizel-Assad has adopted this position all throughout his tenure, even with his 
participation in the Madrid conference on October 1991 where both countries were 
present along with the US, Soviet Union, Lebanon, a joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
delegation, Jordan and representatives from both UN and the European Community. 
During the Madrid conference Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq el Sharaa attacked Israel, 
refuted its legitimacy and reemphasized claiming the Golan Heights and Palestinian 
territories (Gaza strips, West Bank, and Arab Jerusalem). Conversely, Prime Minister 
Shamir showed a more positive stance towards ―peace with the Arab states‖ and did not 
dismiss the possibility of Israeli withdrawal form 1967 territories. This was followed by 
positive bilateral talks in Washington between Syria and Israel in 1992. These talks 
continued through 1993, 1994and 1995 but an advance towards peace did not take 
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place, even with the signing of Oslo accord between PLO and Israel (Ma‘oz 1995, 215-
216-236). 
 In December 1999 bilateral peace talks between Israel and Syria were resumed 
under the auspice of President Bill Clinton and in the presence of Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister el Sharaa. These talks opened in Washington 
and continued in Shepherdstown, Virginia, were doomed to fail because Barak refused 
to sign on the commitment of withdrawal to the 1967 line. The end of the Israeli-Syrian 
talks were declared in Israel and the US after the unsuccessful Geneva summit between 
president Clinton and president Hafiz el-Assad also because Hafiz al-Assad didn‘t 
accept anything less than the full withdrawal to the 1967 lines (Zisser 2007, 148).  
 With Bashar el-Assad assumption of the presidency there were voices of hope in 
Israel regarding the renewal of Syrian-Israeli peace talks. Bashar was viewed as young 
and modern, unlike his father who was perceived as an obstacle to peace because of his 
personality and his identification with the past wars. Yet, Bashar‘s inauguration was 
followed shortly by the second Intifada in October 2000 and renewed military activities 
by Hizbullah against Israel. Following these outbreaks in the region President Bashar el-
Assad took a firm stance against Israel to affirm himself as the leader of the ―Arab 
rejectionist camp‖ (Zisser 2007, 150). 
 During the al Aqsa intifada, Bashar withheld from directly confronting Israel but 
at the same time he continuously attacked the Israeli government. He had understood 
that, because of the intifada and after September 11 and the war on Iraq, Israel has 
gained a closer proximity of its American presence due to their military bases in Iraq. 
Israel now had the chance to retaliate to any military act against its population and it 
strived to seek its legitimacy with a greater thrust. At the Arab leaders‘ summit on 
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October 2000 which was held to discuss helping the Palestinians in their struggle, 
Bashar el-Assad explicitly stated that it was not in the Arabs best interest to have an 
overall Arab confrontation with Israel (Zisser 2007, 154). 
 Similarly to Western, Israel did not expect President Bashar to have his father‘s 
firm stand towards Israel, at the time they did not expect to have serious peace talks 
with Syria in 2008 orchestrated by Turkey. These talks restarted long-stopped 
negotiations between Syria and Israel since the Shepherdstown talks in early 2000. Even 
though several things had changed by that time, Syria‘s peace precondition remained 
the withdrawal of Israel to the pre-1967 war land, which includes the Golan Heights and 
territories of the Jordan River Valley (Hof 2009, 1). 
The 2008 peace talks were preceded by several failed attempts in peace 
initiatives, like the Saudi-sponsored one in 2002. The Saudi Peace plan was presented at 
the Arab summit in Beirut in March 2002. It declared a desire of the entire Arab world 
to put an end to the Arab-Israeli struggle. This plan included the withdrawals of Israel to 
the 1967 border and a Palestinian state would be created in Gaza and the West Bank 
along with a ‗just solution‘ for the Palestinian refugees‘ problem. In turn, this would be 
accompanied by an Arab recognition of the Israeli state. This plan resulted in the Arab 
summit in Riyadh in 2007 (BBC 2007). 
In December 2002, Al Hayat newspaper published Bashar‘s statement in 
response to Bush after a meeting with British scholars: 
I have a message for the Israelis. We are interested in Peace. The Israelis must 
choose between a candidate interested in peace and another who wants 
war…The Arab peace plan is clear. It proposes peace and normal relations to 
Israel on conditions that it withdraws to the 1967 border (Al Hayat 2002).  
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Then in December 2003, in an interview with The New York Times, President 
Bashar el-Assad stated that he wants to resume the peace negotiations andto establish 
normal relations with Israel. This announcement was seen as a sign of a renewed 
initiative from his part because of new worries and created an Israeli debate of how to 
respond because there were speculations about Bashar‘s motives. However Foreign 
Minister Silvan Shalom, Head of military intelligence, as well as several others in the 
Defence field maintained that Israel should respond positively to this proposal in case 
Bashar el-Assad was honest. But Prime Minister Sharon remained doubtful of the 
prospects of Bashar‘s seriousness (ICG 2004,10). 
 Israel‘s response to Bashar‘s statement was unexplainable because there was no 
radical change in his position. He was ready to make peace if Israel would give up the 
Golan Heights but he did not expect Israel to accept his proposal. Ariel Sharon was not 
enthusiastic about restarting the peace talks, as Eyal Zisser noted, ―He was unprepared 
to pay the price of the Golan Heights for peace with Syria‖ (Zisser 2007, 167). 
 In that regard, Ma’ariv newspaper wrote on 6 January 2004 that along with 
Bashar‘s will to start the peace talks with Israel, he is still arming Hizbullah. He used 
the airplanes Syria sent to transport provisions to the earthquake victims in Tehran to 
bring back weapons for Hizbullah (Ma‘ariv 2004).   
The initiation of the peace talks in Ankara came after the emphasis of Israeli 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in April 2007 that Israel is interested in peace with Syria. 
However the latter was still considered as a part of the Axis of Evil (Iran, Iraq, and 
North Korea)and a state that backs terrorism in the region, as published by the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2008. Thus to be able to engage in peace negotiations 
Syria has to stop its support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad organizations. It should cease 
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from ensuring weapons to Hizbullah which destabilizes south Lebanon. Also Olmert 
required Syria to end its ―support for terror‖ in Iraq and renounce its ties with Iran 
(MFA 2008). 
 Nevertheless, Peace talks were started in 2008 in Ankara during which both 
parties stated to NBC News that ―they have declared their intent to conduct these talks 
in good faith and with an open mind‖, with a goal of reaching ―a comprehensive peace‖. 
But when asking Washington about their stand from these talks, White House Press 
Secretary Dana Perino said ―We do not object to this... We'll see how this progresses‖ 
(NBC News 2008). 
 Even though, Syria and Israel have tried to hold bilateral peace talks without US 
arbitration, yet they cannot and will not reach any peace agreement without US help. 
What interests the US in the Middle East is a progress in the Arab-Israeli, a more stable 
situation in Lebanon with a weaker Hizbullah, as well as the containment Jihadi 
Movement, a more stable Iraq and a weaker Iran and a better Arab public perception of 
the US in the region. The US knows that Syria affects all the previous listed issues and a 
Syrian-Israeli peace agreement is a positive step towards reaching them (Salem 2009, 
69). 
 The U.S. would be perceived as a player of peace and stability in the region if it 
were to cater for an Israeli-Syrian peace agreement. However, one argument voiced out 
against American efforts for a peace between Syria and Israel is that Syria is not serious 
about peace and any settlement would mean rewarding Syria for ―bad behaviour‖. This 
argument has no grounds, because Syria has revealed its readiness for ―peace-for-land‖ 
since 1991 (Salem 2009, 71).   
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 All the attempts for a Syrian-Israeli peace so far have failed even though these 
have come so close at several points in history, whether during Hafiz or Bashar tenures. 
Both have been open to the peace talks and the precondition remained the same between 
the two; land for peace. 
 
3.4 - Conclusion 
 The chapter has shown that Bashar el-Assad has moved forward with the same 
foreign policy as his father. When he first came to power, Bashar himself stated in 
interview with Al Safir on 30 December, 2000, that he is the same as his father.  
Whoever thought that I would be more moderate than my father erred. The 
Americans think that our political behaviour is pragmatic, but in practice my 
generation, including myself, show an even greater adherence to national and 
pan-Arab principles than did my father‘s generation (Al Safir 2000).  
 
 Bashar best displayed adherence to his father‘s footsteps in conducting Syria‘s 
foreign policy. He has maintained the strategic partnership with Iran despite all the 
obstacles it has faced, whether from pressure from the West and especially from the 
United States and Israel to end this partnership. He has built on the newly created 
rapprochement by his father with Turkey, and worked greatly on being ―a good 
neighbour‖ to the extent that Turkey eventually hosted Syrian-Israeli peace talks after a 
long history. Finally, Bashar has played his foreign policy cards towards Israel and the 
peace talks the way his father did. 
 This foreign policy realism which started with his father and mainly believes in 
a strong Syria and a strong relationship with the Arab states is at the heart of Bashar‘s 
foreign-policy decision making. A strong Syria can balance Israeli power in the region. 
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A strong Syria, Bashar believes, can also reach peace based on its own terms rather than 
terms imposed on it.  
 The next chapter examines the changes Bashar has made to his foreign policy 
due to new geopolitical challenges. Lebanon and Iraq are the best arenas of such 
challenges. A discussion of Bashar‘s policies in these arenas underscores the different 
challenges he faced in them and the way he handled these challenges in a way not to 
compromise his status as the head of Syria, also not to compromise Syria‘s status as a 
key player in the region. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
BASHAR EL-ASSAD’S GEOPOLITICAL BATTLES 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
 
 After the September 11, 2001 attacks the US changed its foreign policy and 
made combating terrorism its main focus. It adopted an aggressive policy to retaliate to 
these attacks, from the war on Afghanistan to the war on Iraq, to its policy against 
Iranian nuclear power. The United States government perceives Syria as a key player in 
the region with close ties to ―terrorist countries‖ like Iran and supporting ―terrorist 
groups‖ like Hizbullah and Hamas.  
 The American administration started exerting pressure on Syria in hope that it 
will cave in and relinquish its ―anti-Western‖ foreign policy. These pressures 
culminated after the war on Iraq. The U.S. claimed that Syria deliberately opened its 
borders and allowed Islamic terrorist to cross into Iraq. This was followed by the Syria 
Accountability Act. It tried to pressure Syria to end its presence in Lebanon and to stop 
its alleged development of Weapons of Mass Destruction.  
 This chapter examines how Bashar el-Assad reacted to these pressures, and how 
he had to change his father‘s policy towards Iraq and Lebanon because of the new 
challenges Syria faced. This chapter will also examine how these changes have affected 
the position of Syria as a key player in the region. 
 
4.2 - Syria and Lebanon before Bashar 
 Syria entered Lebanon in 1976, however its interest in controlling its ―southern 
backyard‖ dates even before that year. Since the eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in 
1975, between Kamal Jumblat‘s Lebanese National Movement and the PLO on the one 
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hand, and the conservative Christian front on the other, Hafiz el-Assad was playing the 
mediator between the two fronts. However at the same time he backed the Lebanese 
National Movement and the PLO by supplying them with weapons which weakened the 
Lebanese state and eventually invited Syrian‘s intervention. By April 1976 Syrian 
troops had entered Lebanon to prevent a Christian defeat and bring about stability to the 
country. This was the perfect excuse to deploy armed forces in Lebanon and gain 
control over the country (Deeb 2003, 11-18). 
 The signing of the Golan Heights disengagement agreement in May 1974 
leading to a cease fire on the Syrian-Israeli border and the recognition of the PLO as the 
sole representative of the Palestinian people on October 1974 drove Hafiz el-Assad to 
control the PLO, Jordan, and Lebanon, the parties involved in the conflict with Israel. 
To gain that control he intervened militarily in Lebanon. However, he intervened on the 
Christian front‘s side in order not to end up with a radical side in control of Lebanon. 
His plan was to gain full control over Lebanon in order to prevent it from signing a 
peace agreement with Israel and to fight the latter in Lebanese territories (Deeb 2003, 
37). 
 Controlling Lebanon was Hafiz‘s strategic decision, especially that Syria 
considered Lebanon to be part of Greater Syria and its eastern backyard. In his speech 
on 20 July 1976, the Syrian president explained why he decided to intervene militarily 
in Lebanon. For him the defeat of the Christian front would have led to an Israeli 
intervention in Lebanon, which will weaken Syria‘s western border and increase its 
regional isolation. On the other hand a Christian defeat would turn the conflict into an 
international dispute which would have led to the partition of Lebanon and the 
establishment of a pro-Israeli Christian state. Moreover, the defeat of the Christian front 
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and the creation of an entity by the National Movement of Lebanon and the PLO with 
links to Iraq and Libya would lead Syria to an unwanted conflict with Israel (Salloukh 
2005, 15).   
 In an interview with Al Ra’y el-Am a Kuwaiti newspaper in 1976, Syrian 
Foreign Minister Khaddam stated that,  
Any attempt to partition Lebanon by any group or community would mean 
immediate Syrian intervention, for Lebanon was part of Syria and we shall take 
it back if there is any real attempt of partition. It must be clear that this does not 
mean only the four provinces and the coastal areas, but also Mount Lebanon. 
Either Lebanon remains united or it has to be incorporated in Syria (Deeb 2003, 
13).  
 
The Syrian intervention in Lebanon was orchestrated by Henry Kissinger in 
order to allow neutralizing Syrian opposition to an Egyptian-Israeli second 
disengagement agreement in Sinai. This was through secret negotiations between Syria 
and Israel to sign the ―red line agreement‖ which identifies the maximum Lebanese 
territories Syrian troops can be present in and the number of Syrian soldiers allowed. 
Kissinger managed this fact by ―exaggerating Israel‘s desire to intervene in Lebanon to 
save the Christian Lebanese from total defeat‖ (Salloukh 2005, 15-16). 
 Throughout the 1980s Syria and Israel waged a regional struggle over Lebanese 
territories to control Lebanon.  Israel wanted to weaken Syria‘s presence in Lebanon 
which would hinder its regional security and the regime‘s internal security. In March 
1978, Israel established a ―security zone‖ in the south and kept its presence there despite 
UN Security Council Resolution 425 that came out in the same month which calls for 
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory (Salloukh 2005, 16). 
 By 1982 Israel had gained the upper hand in Beirut and insured the election of 
Pro-Israeli Bashir Gemayel as President, through whom Israel planned the 
establishment of a strong Maronite government and the signing of a peace treaty with 
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Israel. However in September of that year Syria organized the assassination of 
Gemayel, through which it had annulled a peace agreement signed between Israel and 
the Lebanese government. It also forced the Lebanese state to abrogate the May 17 
agreement which was signed in 1983 between Amine Gemayel and Israel (Zisser 2007, 
175) 
By 1989 Hafiz el-Assad had the capability of ending the Lebanese civil war, 
restructuring its political system and its governmental institutions and reintroducing life 
to the country after being paralyzed for over a decade. However these accomplishments 
rendered him in full control over Lebanon from which he reaped economic profits 
through numerous Syrian investments in the country (Zisser 2007, 174).     
 In 1989 the Taif accord, the outcome of Saudi, Syrian and U.S. negotiation was 
forced on Lebanon and established Syria‘s control over Lebanon. The accord had 
established Syria as the external arbitrary army of the different parties and emphasized 
the ―distinctive relations‖ between the two countries. It also underscored what was 
agreed upon in the 1943 National Charter, ―Lebanon should never be a source of threat 
to Syria‘s security… Consequently Lebanon does not allow that it be made a corridor or 
a beachhead for any power or state or organization seeking to undermine its security or 
the security of Syria‖ (Salloukh 2005, 17). 
 The Taif accord was drafted in a way to provide a suitable yet unjustifiable 
balance between Lebanon‘s confessional groups (Sunni, Shiite, Christian and Druze). 
The patron of this Accord, Syria, was careful that it will insure its strategic goal in 
Lebanon regardless of the obvious shifts or uncertainties it had shown. ―Put negatively, 
Syria has been concerned to prevent either a Maronite rightist takeover of Lebanon in 
alliance with Israel, or a radical (Lebanese/Palestinian nationalist) takeover threatening 
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both Israeli retaliation and the destabilization of Syria (Sayigh1994, 142). Syria sought 
to protect its security interests in order to balance with Israel‘s power in the region. 
Controlling the Lebanese-Syrian border with Israel was one of its main objectives 
(Usher 1997, 60). 
 Although the Taif accord mentioned that within two years Syria would redeploy 
its troops to the Bekaa Valey, Syria remained on Lebanese territories until 2005. 
Throughout the 1990s and until early 2000 Lebanon was a fruitful investment for Syria 
in two fields. Politically, since Lebanon tied itself to the Syrian track especially in its 
foreign policy regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, and economically because Syria 
benefited from many investments in Lebanon and in exporting Syrian workers to 
Lebanese territory (Zisser 2007, 177). 
 One cannot examine Syria‘s relation with Lebanon without discussing its 
relation with Hizbullah. Hizbullah is a card that Syria used and still uses in its regional 
and international foreign policy. Both Hafez and Bashar el-Assad used Hizbullah to 
pressure Israel on its Northern border. The strategy is to regain the Golan Heights 
without having to wage war against Israel. It was used even when Damascus was in 
peace talks with Israel. 
 Even when he was negotiating peace with Israel, Hafiz el-Assad used to play the 
―Hizbullah card‖ on the Lebanese Southern border. Attacks on Israeli soldiers by 
Hizbullah militants were used to put pressure on Israel. However, Syria and Hizbullah 
did not always have good relationships. Things changed after the end of the civil war 
and the Taif agreement. Before this time, there clearly was a competition between Syria, 
Iran, Hizbullah and Amal.  There are a lot of reasons for this, Syria considered Amal its 
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greatest ally in Lebanon, and it resented Iran‘s attempt to create its own ally inside 
Lebanon.  
 Syria dominated Lebanon after the 1990s, paving the way to a new structural 
change inside the party of God, ―Encouraged by both Syria and Iranian mentors, the 
Party of God dropped its earlier objections to participating in Lebanon‘s political 
system‖ (Jaber 1997, 72). There were many factors that led to a new Syrian-Hizbullah 
alliance. The death of Hafez Al-Asad paved the way to Hizbullah‘s Secretary General 
Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah to form a new relation with his son Bashar. ―Once Bashar 
assumed the presidency, Nasrallah demonstratively offered his patronage to the young 
leader‖ (Zisser 2007, 185). This relationship, however, is not strictly one sided. Bashar 
had also agreed to let religious figures deploy themselves in the Alawite Mountain. This 
breakthrough proved that Hizbullah was able to become a great ally for Bashar. As 
Zisser points out, ―this step increased Bashar‘s dependence on Hizbullah.‖ (Zisser 2007, 
185)  
One factor that commenced the relationship between Syria and Hizbullah is the 
use of the Syrian border in the export of the weapons to Hizbullah. Syria has turned a 
blind eye towards the arms smuggling because its motive is to use Hizbullah 
strategically in their war against Israel. The common objective between Syria and 
Hizbullah is their hostility against Israel and their common fight against Zionism. This 
goal has been the most important tie between the neighbouring country and the 
Lebanese military party, Hizbullah. As Bashar el-Assad mentioned frequently 
―Hizbullah is a Lebanese resistance organization, although we stand by it politically and 
morally.‖ (Zisser 2007, 160) 
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Harik clearly states the motives behind Syria‘s interest in Hizbullah. According 
to Harik ―Assad needed two assets: his own surrogate force that could provide the 
necessary disturbances and frictions that might keep the Golan issue alive; and some 
help with the logistics of the strategy he has in mind. As we shall see, Hizbullah and 
Iran provided these assets.‖ (Harik 2007, 31) Therefore, we notice that the Syrian – 
Hizbullah factor consisted of a two way winning approach from both sides. Hizbullah is 
not Syria‘s tool to reach its objectives, both need each other. Syria needed Hizbullah as 
a strong resistance movement in Lebanon in order to reach its goals in the Israeli 
conflict, and Hizbullah needed Syria geographically to transfer its weaponry and as a 
strong ally in this region.  
 Things changed drastically in 2000. On the national level, 2000 marked the year 
when the Israeli forces evacuated from southern Lebanon and all the territories were 
restored except Shebaa and the Kfarshouba Heights, according to Hizbullah. This 
marked a very important cornerstone for both Hizbullah and the Lebanese in general. 
Even on this special national day, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah in his victory speech on 
May 26, 2000 mentions his two allies. ―In addition to Lebanon, two states and two men 
have to be mentioned, and their roles acknowledged: the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Assad‘s Syria; the leader Khameini, and the great Arab leader, President Hafez al-
Assad.‖ (Noe 2007, 234) However, liberation did not lead to the disarmament of 
Hizbullah. Syria was still present on Lebanese soil, and it supported Hizbullah to protect 
itself and use it as its card in the Israeli conflict. All this would change with the 9/11 
attacks.  
  
4.3 - Syria’s ‘Brotherly’ Relations with Lebanon 
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In his lecture in the Syrian Higher Military academy in 2010, Deputy Syrian 
Foreign Minister Abed el Fattah Ammoura discussed the international and regional 
repercussions of 9/11 on the entire region. In his discussion of Lebanon, Ammoura 
explained that on several occasions the Bush Administration tried to conspire against 
Syria believing that it can marginalize it from Middle East politics. The assassination of 
the late Rafik Hariri in February 2004 which was followed by several bombings in 
Lebanon led to Syria‘s withdrawal from Lebanon. Ammoura pointed that Syria had 
already done four waves of redeployment from Lebanon before UN Security Council 
Resolution 1559, since President Bashar became President (Ammoura 2010, 10).   
In June 2001, Syrian troops had started withdrawing from Beirut to continue a 
redeployment strategy that started in 2000. The strategy was to move from ―political‖ to 
―defensive‖ positions. But this had stopped after the Israeli withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon. The Israeli withdrawal disturbed Syria because it deprived it from its 
resistance card and its strategy to gain Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights 
without going to war against Israel. However, after the Israeli withdrawal, local 
condemnation of Syria‘s presence in Lebanon and involvement in Lebanese matters 
increased. Basharel-Assad stated that he would not relinquish his strategic position in 
Lebanon as long as Lebanese and Syrian territories were still occupied by Israel. This 
statement disproves the claim that he ordered the redeployment because of Lebanese 
pressures (Perthes 2001, 41).    
By April 2005, all Syrian Army troops had withdrawn from Lebanon, thus 
putting an end to the Syrian military presence in Lebanon since 1976. In a speech given 
by president Bashar to the Syrian People‘s Assembly on 3 March 2005, he argued that 
the withdrawal is a continuation of the strategy towards Lebanon Syria had started since 
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he arrived to Presidency. In reality, however, this move was due to international and 
regional pressure on Syria to abandon Lebanon and preserve the regime (Zisser 2007, 
172). 
In his speech before the People‘s Assembly on 3 March 2005, Bashar el-Assad 
explained what his view on UNSCR 1559 regarding Syria‘s withdrawal from Lebanon: 
A final point, withdrawal does not harm Syria's interests. On the contrary, it 
strengthens Syria's interests. That is why we started withdrawing five years ago. 
We have withdrawn over 64 per cent of the forces; and this is something even 
many Syrians don't know…You know we carried out four withdrawals before 
1559 was passed. The fifth withdrawal was last September. The main thing is 
that these withdrawals ensured stability in Lebanon. That is why we told them 
that we don't have a problem with 1559; and we don't think it is against our 
interests. It is about withdrawal, and the Taif Accord, to which Syria is 
committed and has always supported, provides for withdrawal. Thus, we don't 
have a problem with the United Nations regarding 1559. So, in principle we 
don't have any problem. The important thing is the mechanism. The difference 
between 1559 and Taif Accord is that the Taif Accord has a mechanism while 
1559 does not provide for a mechanism. They only said withdrawal and every 
state in the world is interpreting it as it wishes (syria-alassad.org 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, Syrian President made it seem as if it was his decision to pull out 
of Lebanon, Syria‘s withdrawal was unexpected and humiliating. It weakened Syria‘s 
regional security interests and made it vulnerable to international pressure. It was 
sudden to the Syrians as well as to their Lebanese allies. Within one month all Syrian 
troops returned to their country. Even Syrian intelligence in Lebanon was weakened 
(Salloukh 2005, 14). 
Syria‘s withdrawal from Lebanon was rooted in a number of mistakes. The most 
important is the extension of Emile Lahoud‘s presidency by a decision from Damascus 
in 2004. This decision provoked UN Security Council Resolution 1559.  The 
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri on 14 February 2005 affected the Lebanese 
public opinion which blamed the assassination on Syria, and provoked international 
pressure on Syria to immediately apply Resolution 1559. Another reason for this 
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pressure was the deteriorating American-Syrian relations after the War on Iraq (Zisser 
2007, 172). 
In 2004, a new factor came into the picture.  UN Security Council Resolution 
1559 passed on 2 September. This had a huge impact on Lebanon, Syria and Hizbullah. 
The international arena started to pressure Syria and Hizbullah. In this Resolution, the 
two major points were ―2. Calls upon all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from 
Lebanon; 3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-
Lebanese militias;‖ (UNSCR 1559 2004).These two articles were the core of this 
Resolution and were meant to pressure both Syria and Hizbullah. The foreign forces 
meant in these terms were Syria and the armed militias were Hizbullah.  
 Thus even at the international level the Syrian-Hizbullah alliance started to 
become a burden on the Lebanese government. On 14 February 2005, Rafik Al-Harriri 
was assassinated. This unforgettable day became a national day of grievance when the 
Lebanese people felt they have lost the key figure in their political life. 
Things started to degenerate in Lebanon since that time. UNCR 1559 started to find its 
grounds inside Lebanon and the evacuation of the Syrian forces became inevitable. 
Lebanon became a battle field divided into two camps. The ―Cedar Revolution‖ pushed 
the Syrians out of Lebanon by the popular movement calling for the Syrian evacuation 
out of Lebanon.  
 Commenting on Resolution 1559, on March 3, 2005, Bashar el-Assad stated 
before the People‘s assembly;  
―The fourth point, as far as 1559 is concerned, among all its provisions, the one 
related to Syria is withdrawal. Contrary to what many people believe, this is the 
simplest provision; because Syria is not against withdrawal. We started 
withdrawing in 2000. So when we talk about withdrawal, does anyone in Syria 
say that we will remain in Lebanon? Of course not. So, this is the simplest 
provision‖ (syria-alassad.org 2005) 
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However, the two Lebanese camps did not share the same perceptions. The 14
th
 
of March pushed towards 1559 and the Taif Accord, while the 8
th
 of March represented 
the counter camp. It stood in defence of its long standing ally Syria. On the 8
th
 of 
March, in the demonstration that took place in down town Beirut, Nasrallah delivered 
his allegiance to Syria. ―We are gathered here today to endorse the goals we made 
public at the press conference, chief among them the need to offer our thanks to Assad‘s 
Syria: the Syria of Hafiz al-Assad, the Syria of Bashar el-Assad, and to the honourable 
and steadfast Syrian people. We would also like to offer our thanks to the resisting 
Syrian army, which stood at our side during all the years of defence and resistance.‖ 
(Noe 2007, 321) 
Thus even when the whole of Lebanon was in mourning, Hizbullah did not hide 
its great connection with Syria. In opposition to the Lebanese consensus, Hizbullah did 
not hide its strategic relations with Syria. Syria considers this relation as one of its best 
strategies in Lebanon and the region, since Hizbullah has quite a huge impact on the 
Lebanese politics. Moreover, Nasrallah openly declared the depth of his relation with 
Syria even though it might not be present on the ground anymore. 
 Even with Syria managing to keep such a support inside Lebanon through 
Hizbullah, one cannot dismiss that it was forced out of Lebanon and this fact has had 
great repercussions on it. For Bashar el-Assad, his loss of military control in Lebanon 
marked a turning point in his presidency. As aforementioned, Bashar had, on several 
occasions, tried to explain that Syria‘s withdrawals from Lebanon was already planned 
and in motion. Bashar also tried to explain how convenient for Damascus the 
withdrawal is, since it was in Lebanon only to preserve the latter‘s security. These 
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explanations were given to the Syrian people and to the international community as 
well. But despite Bashar‘s trials of softening the matter, we cannot miss that the 
withdrawal was an unexpected blow to Damascus. The next section examines the 
effects of Syria‘s withdrawal from Lebanon on it and on Lebanon as well. 
 
4.4 - Syria and Lebanon After the Withdrawal 
 Syria has gone through a long road of increased isolation before it withdrew 
from Lebanon. This started by the end of the peace talks between Syria and Israel in 
April 2000, followed by the death of Hafiz el-Assad and the succession of the 
presidency by Bashar, later followed by 11 September 2001 attacks on the US which led 
to a change in US policies and the newly acquired ―war against terrorism‖ policy. The 
isolation process picked up after the renewal of the presidency of Emile Lahoud 
followed by the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri on February 2005. This series of 
events created increased US impatience against Syria which drove Washington to issues 
the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereign Restoration Act (ICG 2005, 1). 
 Bashar‘s renewal of Lahoud‘s tenure was an attempt to strengthen Syria‘s grip 
on Lebanon. Internally, however, it back fired and isolated Syria regionally and 
internationally leading to its forced withdrawal from Lebanon. This has affected Syria 
economically because of its financial ties with Lebanon (ICG 2005, 29).  
 Even though the withdrawal was smooth and ambassadors between both capitals 
were appointed in March 2009, a turning point in the two countries‘ relations, Syria and 
her allies in Lebanon voiced warnings of insecurities in Lebanon because of the Syrian 
withdrawal. Their argument is that Syria is the reason behind stability in Lebanon. 
These warnings were taken as threats by Lebanese opposition groups. As one member 
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of 14 March noted in an interview with ICG ―This is Syria‘s traditional game: create a 
problem then present yourself as the only solution‖ (ICG 2005, 32). 
The wave of bombings that took place in Lebanon between 2005 and 2006 were 
in New Jdeideh, Kalsik, Sed el Bouchrieh, Broumana, Monot, Zalka and Jounieh as 
well as the assassination of Samir Kassir, Georges Hawi, Gebran Tueini, Pierre 
Gemayel, Walid Eido, Antoine Ghanem, Francois el Hajj, Wissam Eid, Saleh Aridi. 
There was also the assassination attempts on May Chidiac, Elias el Murr and Marwan 
Hamadeh. Commenting on some of the bombings in an interview with ICG, a Lebanese 
official said that ―Syria has a long tradition of remote-control, long-distance attacks. 
Especially if the regime feels it is the next tarket for the US, it will do what it can to 
divert attention to Lebanon. People often target Syria; Lebanon pays the price‖ (ICG 
2005, 32). And despite the fact that Syria has denied any hand in the bombings that 
occurred, the Lebanese who were members of the opposition camp accused it of being 
the mastermind behind them. Based on these accusations they have request the 
international court to investigate them along with the assassination of PM Harriri.  
Syria‘s geopolitical arena changed dramatically after Bashar assumed the 
presidency in Syria. Syria‘s policies in Lebanon reflected these changes and responded 
to them. My next section discuses Syria‘s changed relations with Iraq and reason behind 
these behind these changes.  
 
4.5 - Syria and Iraq: From Enemies to Friendly Neighbours 
 
 Bashar el-Assad survived a trial period after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
This posed a threat to the regime in Syria. After the invasion it seemed that Syria was 
next on the United States‘ agenda of regime change in the Middle East. Nonetheless 
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Bashar el-Assad turned out to be a skilled player in the geopolitical scene and gained 
strength regionally and internationally more than he ever had since his accession to 
power.   
Bashar el-Assad turned out to be as skilled as his father Hafiz el-Assad in 
regional politics. Surviving the 2003 invasion and afterwards the assassination of 
former PM Hariri as well as the 2006 war in Lebanon between Hizbullah and Israel 
were clear examples. Between his support to Hizbullah and being on the border of an 
invaded state while having a similar regime, he has successfully emerged as a powerful 
player. Instead of a weak and fearful position, Syria came out as a winner from this 
situation since it was recognized by the United States and European countries as a 
needed player in Iraqi matters. ―Syria owes much of its growing influence in the region 
to Iraq. On this issue, the Assad regime deftly managed to transform what is in reality a 
problematic hand into a winning one‖ (Simon 2009, 1).  
Moreover, the United States later changed its isolation policy towards Syria, 
Iraq‘s neighbour, and embraced a more cooperative policy at least until 2011 when 
popular uprising exploded in Syria. Furthermore, the invitation of Syria to the meeting 
in Baghdad on March 10, 2007 which gathered Iran, Syria, American and European 
diplomats was a clear example of the changed policies of the West in acknowledging 
Syria‘s influence in the region (Yacoubian 2007, 1).   
 Iraq and Syria have been enemies for most of their modern history. They have 
fought for power and supremacy in the Arab world since their creation as independent 
states. The two countries entered coalitions against each other: Iraq entered the Baghdad 
Pact in 1955 with Iran, Pakistan and Egypt, and Syria created the United Arab Republic 
with Egypt. Both coalitions collapsed by 1961 and power in the two countries was taken 
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by a coup of the Baath Party in 1963. These coups were followed by a coup by Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq in 1968 and another one by Hafiz el-Assad in Syria in 1970. This added 
a personal rivalry between the two. Though both regimes had the same ideology, 
however the two leaders remained enemies for the next twenty-five years (Simon 2009, 
3). 
Several issues have led the two countries to embrace opposing positions, starting 
with Iraq‘s rejection of the disengagement agreements with Israel which resulted from 
Syria‘s participation in the peace process. Thus Iraq, leading the Arab rejectionist camp, 
denounced Resolutions 242 and 338. This was followed by disagreements over the 
Lebanese civil war, the Islamic revolution in Iran, and the first Gulf war. The two 
countries have completely severed their relations after Syria‘s support for Iran in the 
1980-1988 war. Iraq retaliated by instigating anti-Syrian actions in Lebanon (ICG 2004, 
15). 
Both Iraq and Syria supported each other‘s enemies: Syria supported Jalal 
Talibani (Iraqi Kurds leader), members of the Da‘wa Party and the communists, while 
Iraq sheltered rogue Syrian Baathists and members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. 
In 1976 tension nearly escalated to military confrontation when Syria advanced 
militarily into Lebanon and Iraq gathered its troops at its borders. The conflict then 
shifted into the Lebanese soils where each country supported an opposing camp in the 
civil war; Iraq supported Michel Aoun against Syria. Furthermore Syria fought with 
American troops in the 1990-1991 Gulf war to keep Iraq from becoming an Arab 
superpower (ICG 2004, 15).  
The mending in the relations between the two capitals began at the end of Hafiz 
el-Assad‘s rule. The long closed borders were opened in 1997.  This shift was due to 
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several reasons, mainly growing hostility by neighbouring countries such as Turkey and 
Jordan, and most importantly the economic benefits behind this opening (ICG 2004, 
16).      
 
4.6 – Bashar’s Syria and Iraq 
 Syria was still playing on the American side in 2002. It had voted for UN 
Security Council 1441 which requested Iraq to declare its possession of Weapons of 
Mass destruction in order to allow UN inspectors in the country. Syria‘s support for 
UNSCR 1441 was not approved to be a green light for a military attack against Iraq 
(ICG 2004, 17). 
 This attitude changed when clear American voices rally for a military attack on 
Iraq were heard. Bashar el-Assad then resorted to a more vocal attitude in opposing the 
war against Iraq. Syria even rejected a Kuwaiti-Qatari offer to persuade Saddam to 
resign. Directly after the initiation of the attack Bashar el-Assad publicly rejected the 
war and recalled the Arab Defence Agreement which states that ―if an Arab country is 
invaded other Arab countries should defend it‖ (ICG 2004, 17). 
Syrian officials stated publically what their stance towards the war was. Foreign 
Minister Faruq el Sharaa declared before the Foreign Affairs committee of the People‘s 
Assembly in March 2003 that Syria wants Iraq‘s victory and he compared the United 
States to Hitler‘s Third Reich (Zisser 2007, 140). In an interview with Al Safir 
newspaper, Bashar el-Assad warned that Syria will not sit back and watch the recent 
events, since Syria might be the next in line on the United States‘ agenda (Al Safir, 27 
March 2003). 
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Syrian officials even allowed demonstration on their territory against the attack 
on Iraq signalizing that ―Syrian street‖ severely opposed these attacks. Bashar gained 
popular support for his stance. Thus Bashar‘s reaction raised his popularity in the Arab 
world and not only in Syria because of his anti-war stance. Some argue that Syria‘s 
reaction was based on its expectation of a strong Iraqi resistance; others argue that it 
was based on its fear of a US military attack on Syria afterwards (ICG 2004, 18). 
In response to this reaction the West accused Syria of allowing militants to cross 
into Iraq, as well as allowing Iraqi officials safe haven in Syria. Some have also accused 
Syria of facilitating militants‘ recruitment on its territory. Thus, Syria‘s reaction to these 
accusations was to close its borders in April 2003 and to adopt a more friendly tone 
with Washington. Damascus also assisted in arresting some Iraqi officials that took 
refuge in its territory as well as softened its position on the Arab-Israeli peace process 
(Zisser 2007, 141). 
       Despite Syria‘s claims of stopping militants‘ crossing inside Iraq, United 
States‘ irritation towards Syria grew as attacks on US troops increased. Syria has 
influence on the Sunni triangle in Northern Iraq since some tribes, like the Shammar, 
are present in Syria and in Northern Iraq as well. Syria was accused of having 
connections to an attack on U.S. troops in Faluja in 2004. American officials claimed 
that they have retrieved documents that proved that former Baath leaders were 
organizing the attacks from Syrian grounds (Zisser 2007, 145).  
Even Iraqi officials have accused the Syrian government of not doing enough to 
stop insurgents from crossing its borders. Al Qaeda Jihadists and former Iraqi Baathist 
elements resided in Syria and crossed its borders into Iraq. But, Syrian officials stated 
on several occasions how difficult it is to safeguard its borders. Bashar el-Assad have 
65 
 
explained himself in his speech before the People‘s Assembly in March 2005, that a 
delegation visited Syria on December 2004 comprising representatives from the U.S. 
Defence Department, the State Department, intelligence, and the army. The delegation‘s 
main goal was to insure that Syria is cooperating in maintaining its borders. He 
commented that for sure Syria is cooperating however, 
―We said that was impossible. Of course we don't claim that the borders are 
completely controlled. Usually the Americans say they could not control their 
borders with Mexico, yet they tell us to control our borders. It is a strange 
argument‖ (syria-alassad.org 2005).  
 
Syria‘s support of the insurgency in Iraq was its way of defending its 
geopolitical interests; however, in November 2006 Syria signed a security cooperation 
agreement with Iraq in order to control its borders. Furthermore, it requested the 
assistance of the U.S. and Britain because of its incapability to hold full control of the 
huge border between Syria and Iraq. Nonetheless, a report by the National Intelligence 
Estimate on Iraq in February 2007 suggested that even if the insurgency inside Iraq 
diminished largely, it will have a very minimal effect on the security inside Iraq because 
the latter is moved by internal factors (Yacoubian 2007, 3). 
 The confrontation between the United States and Syria deteriorated throughout 
2004 because of the Syrian position towards the war on Iraq as well as its policy 
towards Lebanon. It then climaxed with the prompt issuance of Syria Accountability 
Act in May 2004. American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, stated that ―Syria‘s 
conduct is turning that country to an obstacle to progress in Arab-Israeli peace process 
and in the reforms that the U.S. sought to bring about in the Middle East, and 
responsible for causing serious damage to relations between the two countries‖( Zisser 
2007, 145).  
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Bashar el-Assad commented on his relationship with the American 
administration in an interview with the New York Times on December 1, 2003. He 
explained that the reason behind this deteriorating relationship is not Iraq but Israel. 
The Israeli factor is the only one that is still pushing Syrian-American 
relationship into a difficult period. Otherwise, why did we cooperate with the 
United States against terrorism? Why did we help the United States in 
combating terrorism? We could have ignored that completely. This makes me 
ask this question: if Syria is cooperating with the U.S. and offering a great help 
including saving American lives, how can the U.S. response be so negative 
towards Syria? The problem is not Iraq (New York Times2003). 
 
In an attempt to be more involved in the future of Iraq, Syrian Foreign Minister 
Walid el-Moallem visited Baghdad in November 2006. This visit was historical because 
it occurred after 24 years of no relations between the two states. Syria has long had 
many interests in Iraq because of its geographical proximity, from political, to economic 
and trade interests. The economic relations between the countries were amended in 
1997 and 2006, marking a new page in the bilateral diplomatic relations (Yacoubian 
2007, 2). 
 
4.7 - Syrian- Iraqi Economic Relations under Bashar 
Bashar el-Assad‘s ascension to the presidency in Syria was the main turning 
point in the diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Damascus. Upon his accession 
to power Bashar and Saddam signed several bilateral agreements and reopened their 
borders. This was made official by the visit of Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim el 
Douri to Damascus in November 2000 (Simon 2009, 4). 
The economic relations were accelerated through many steps taken by both 
countries. These involved reopening the borders, lifting visa requirements for Syrian 
and Iraqi citizens, signing agreements related to commerce, transportation and 
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communication. These agreements brought mutual benefits since Syria had an interest 
in being part of Iraqi economy and Iraq saw in Syria as a gateway from UN trade 
sanctions (Gambill 2001, 1).   
 The economic rapprochement continued, later reaching a tariff reduction 
agreement between both countries signed in January 2001 by Syrian Prime Minister 
Muhammad Mustafa Miru and Iraqi Vice President Tahan Yassin Ramadan. This 
agreement was meant to reduce the trade restrictions between the two countries. It was a 
―starting point towards turning over a new leaf of Syrian-Iraqi cooperation‖ (Sana 
2001).  
 Another turning point in Iraqi-Syrian economic relations was implemented in 
November 2000 when Basharel-Assad decided to reopen the oil pipeline linking Kirkuk 
oil fields with Syria‘s port of Banias. This breakthrough allowed Syria to import around 
150.000 to 200.000 barrels of oil per day for a discounted price thus increasing its 
export its own oil at the international barrel price. On the other hand Iraq benefited by 
escaping UN sanctions which imposed monitoring Iraqi oil revenues and imposing that 
they ―be disbursed only for humanitarian purposes‖ (Gambill 2001, 2).    
 Furthermore, Iraq opened its market for low quality cheap Syrian products in the 
late 1990s, which were also exported duty free. By 2001 the Syrian-Iraqi Higher 
committee had signed a financial and commercial protocol to encourage this type of 
trade. In 2002 they started forming a joint Iraqi-Syrian holding company to administer 
the financial projects of the two countries (ICG 2004, 16). 
 Having reached 10 per cent of Syria‘s GDP, in 2003 Syrian Iraqi trade had 
stopped due to the war on Iraq. However, it was resumed a few months after the 
American attacks. During the war, Syria and Iraq had between 100$ and 200$ million in 
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trade. By 2007, this number reached 800$ million in trade which was the biggest 
number scored during their trading years. Syria has also benefited from the Iraqi 
expatriates, 1.3$ billion were added to its economy (Simon 2009, 17).  
 Despite the financial benefits for Syria, the 2003 war against Iraq had negative 
implications on the country. Syria spends more than US$1.5 billion a year on Iraqi 
immigrants. Even though it costs each Iraqi US$50 to stay in Syria legally, they are still 
a burden on its economy and it wants their return eventually to Iraq. However many 
Iraqis who have returned to Iraq in 2007 returned to Syria due to the security unrest in 
Iraq (Oudat, August 2008). After the uprising in Syria, some of them returned back to 
Syria. 
 
4.8 - Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how Bashar el-Assad has changed his policies in 
order to cope with the pressure he faced in order to preserve the regional balance of 
power in the case of Iraq, also to maintain the security of the Syrian ruling regime in the 
case of Lebanon.   
 Syria has faced a great deal of pressure from the United Sates to change its 
policy vis-à-vis neighbouring countries and terrorist groups. The pressure increased 
greatly after the toppling of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the U.S. presence militarily at 
its borders. The American administration requested Syria to stop its support for 
Hizbullah and Palestinian militants as well as control its borders with Iraq to stop 
Jihadists infiltration.  The military attack on Iraq pushed Syria to change its policy 
towards Iraq and to oppose the U.S. This was rooted in Syria‘s geographical proximity 
to Iraq and the fear of another attack on Syria. The Syria Accountability Act was the 
69 
 
turning point for Syria to change its policy towards Lebanon and to withdraw from its 
territories. The next chapter sums up the aspects of this thesis and provides some 
thoughts on the current uprising in Syria and the future effects this situation has on 
Syria and on its relations with Neighbouring countries. 
Chapter Five 
 
Conclusion 
 
5.1 – Summary and General Findings 
Most Scholars have tried to explain Syria‘s foreign policy and the affecting 
constituents which play a major role in shaping it. Using the realist theory of balance of 
power, I have tackled the most important factors playing this role. Syria‘s foreign policy 
emancipates out of its role in the Middle Eastern politics and sets it in the middle of the 
Arab Israeli conflict. Due to this fact, Hafiz and later on Bashar have strived to keep 
their policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Golan Heights in check to win 
over their people. Syria‘s foreign policy stems out of the need to keep rallying the 
Syrian population with its governing system. Syria has also aligned itself with Iran in 
order to protect itself against the U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region especially 
after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Nevertheless, Syria has made sure not to cut the 
umbilical cord with the states completely since it needs to leverage its economic 
survival through Iraq and as a way to negotiate the return of the Golan Heights. 
The Syrian government has established durable relations with some of its 
neighbouring countries like its relations with Iran due to their common interest to 
balance out the United States‘ meddling in the affairs of the Middle East especially after 
2003 invasion of Iraq. Both countries are always emphasizing their deep rooted foreign 
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policy ties as they are facing the same hegemon. Their relationship which started with 
Hafiz el Assad and survived the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranian revolution and even the 
invasion of Iraq has proved to work for both sides. Iran has allied itself with the Arab 
Syria as a means to win herself a strategic partner in the Arab world and revitalize their 
interests in the region especially since Syria is the connection between Hizbullah and 
Iran.  
Syria‘s geopolitical arena changed dramatically after Bashar assumed the 
presidency in Syria. Syria‘s policies in Lebanon reflected these changes and responded 
to them. On the other hand, it has played its cards smart by finding a rather powerful 
ally in the region to support it economically due to its secluded position especially after 
the 2005 assassination of Hariri. Syria down plays its foreign policy in the Middle East 
by having a more diplomatic approach towards the case of Iraq for example. Though, 
they had opposed the Iraqi invasion of 2003, yet they have cooperated with the 
Americans to rid them of Islamic insurgencies. Both countries have tried to seek to 
maximize their interests with all the key players in the region while trying to protect 
their strong alliance. Their marriage is based on mutual interest without the possibility 
of a conflict of interest and same-fate strategy. If opportunities arise for either any of the 
two countries, the other turns a blind eye as to not affect their mutual interests. Their 
foreign policy is more of protective policy of each other without eliminating one sided 
interests when the need arises. 
As aforementioned, Bashar el Assad has worked on the friendships his father 
had started with countries like Iran and Turkey. In order to sustain Syria‘s key role in 
the region, as well as preserving the regional balance of power with Israel. The above 
discussed case studies have shown that Bashar el Assad has moved forward with the 
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same foreign policy as his father. When he first came to power Bashar himself has 
stated in an interview with Al Safir on December 30, 2000, that he is the same as his 
father.  
 Bashar best displayed adherence to his father‘s footsteps in conducting Syria‘s 
foreign policy. He has maintained the strategic partnership with Iran even with all the 
obstacles this partnership has faced, whether from pressure from the West and 
especially from the United States and Israel to end this partnership. He has built on the 
newly created friendship by his father with Turkey, and worked greatly on being ―a 
good neighbour‖ to the extent that eventually Turkey hosted Syrian-Israeli peace talks 
after being long dormant. And finally, Bashar has played his foreign policy cards 
towards Israel and the peace talks same as his father did.  
 As we have seen earlier, both Hafiz el Assad and his son Bashar have put a great 
deal of importance on the game of diplomatic relations with neighbouring countries as 
well as Western countries. This has benefited both leaders in gaining legitimacy inside 
Syria by mobilizing the public against the United States and Israel in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
 
5.2 – Future Inquiries 
 The current Syrian regime cannot keep on focusing on the International and 
Regional foreign policy-making it has mastered for the past 40 years. Though this 
strategy, as we have seen in this paper, has led Syria to become a key player in the 
Region and a main decision maker in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but the recent events 
have put several question marks on the sustainability of the regime in Syria.  
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Fawwaz Traboulsi discussed the current situation in Syria and noted that even 
though Syria is the last Arab country to endure the domino effect of the Arab uprisings, 
yet it is not immune from it. The uprisings which started in Tunis then moved to Egypt, 
later Yemen then Bahrain and Libya have reached Syria in February 2011 (Traboulsi 
2011). 
Traboulsi explained the policy of Mumana‘a Syria practiced by focusing on 
Syria‘s international rather than internal legitimacy. Syria has sustained this policy by 
focusing on its regional role on several levels. Both Hafiz and Bashar have played the 
Hizbullah and the Palestinian resistance cards in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They have 
maintained their alliance with Iran and they have kept the Peace on the Israeli Northern 
Front (Traboulsi 2011). Syria‘s regional and international diplomatic policy throughout 
the 40 years of the Assad rule was enough to sustain the stability of the country 
internally and to keep the legitimacy of the ruling regime however as it is clear by the 
current uprising is that it is no longer enough.  
The need for internal reform is as pressing as it ever was and Bashar should 
tackle several economic and social reforms including the following: 1- Stop the State of 
Emergency in Syria and release the political detainees from prison. 2- Stop the Baath 
Party rule and allow the formation of Parties. 3- Issue a new Law for freedom of speech 
and freedom of establishment of Newspapers. 4- Incorporate Security and Intelligence 
forces in one institution having a clear goal of National Defence. 5- Formulation of a 
new elections Law that does not include the current quota. 6- Give the People‘s 
Assembly the power to give the vote of confidence to the government (Traboulsi 2011).  
The on-going debate is whether the uprising in Syria is driven by the Syrian 
popular demand or by foreign forces. In an interview with Ahmad Shokr and Anjali 
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Kamat, on September 02, 2011, Traboulsi notes that ―the Syrian regime knows this 
uprising is not a conspiracy and that foreign intervention is very limited‖ (Traboulsi 
2011). He continues that foreign intervention is propaganda by the Syrian regime to 
inflict fear and supress the population. 
Whether this uprising was started internally or not, it is obvious that the 
international community is using it to inflict pressure on the Syrian government. The 
current pressure for reform on behalf of the international community, from United 
States to European countries, is to drive Syria into coping with these countries‘ 
demands that have been voiced since 9/11 attacks. These demands are; to end Syria‘s 
strategic alliance with Iran, to end its armament of Hizbullah, to close Hamas offices in 
Syria and to re-enter the peace negotiations with Israel under Israeli-American terms. 
Also Syria is requested to join the World Trade Organization which will lead to foreign 
intervention in Syria‘s economy leading to inflicting debt on the Syrian government 
noting that it is till now one of the few countries which is debt free.  
We need to look also at the effect of this current situation on the Syrian relation 
with its neighbouring countries such as Turkey. Lately Erdogan has vocally expressed 
his dissatisfaction with the Syrian government violent suppression of the uprising as 
well as the unwillingness of Syria‘s introduction of reform to the government‘s policies 
and laws. The Turkish President has threatened to cut any relation with Syria if it 
doesn‘t stop the violence and cave to the Syrian people demand. 
 However, ―the Turkish threats are much louder than any actions they are willing 
to take. They simply want to mobilize international mediation to solve the crisis‖ 
(Traboulsi 2011). He also proceeds by stating that ―the Unites States still seems to be 
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holding on the idea that Syria is a factor of relative stability on the northern border of 
Israel and there is no alternative to the regime‖(Traboulsi 2011).  
Finally, we need to note that the Syrian regime has reached a critical point. If it 
caves in to the pressures of introducing reforms it might lead to the change of the ruling 
Baath regime eventually by democratic vote. And if it continues repressing the uprising 
it might lead to the regime‘s overthrow as has happened to other Arab authoritarian 
regimes. What is next for Syria and for Bashar el-Assad? Will the Assad regime fall 
after 40 years of rule? Will the army take control and administer democratic elections or 
will the later de delayed as is happening in Egypt? 
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